By Heather Roberson
When I learned that my North Macedonia’s colleague, Xhabir Deralla, was to receive the prestigious Solidarity Award for Journalists for Southeastern Europe, I experienced a mixture of emotions that has become increasingly familiar to me over the past two decades of knowing and working with him. I am proud; I am impressed; and I am, unfortunately, also quite terrified.
I am proud, because I have witnessed, over these years, Deralla’s work as a journalist and human rights leader at the forefront of the fight against racism, nationalism, and authoritarianism in North Macedonia and the Balkans. I am proud because I have watched as the organization he founded, Civil-Centre for Freedom, has grown and evolved from a loosely configured group of artists and activists working to prevent war in the 1990s and early 2000s, to what it is today, a robust organization with seasoned staff and a network of volunteers committed to (among other things) monitoring democratic processes, reporting and analyzing disinformation, and maintaining multiple wide-reaching media platforms.
I am also impressed, and very pleased, that Deralla has been recognized for this work by an organization like the South East Europe Association. I am particularly pleased that South East Europe Association recognized the ways that Deralla’s work as a journalist and editor are in tandem, and not in conflict, with his work in human rights – that he is no less a journalist for being a human rights leader, and no less a human rights leader for being a journalist.
So why am I terrified? I am terrified, because I have witnessed, in recent years in North Macedonia, the rapid rise of the very nationalism and racism that Deralla has long been fighting. Even in casual conversation, I will hear people refer to ethnic others who are “not like us,” who move in ways that “people like us” can’t possibly understand, and who are taking everything, ruining everything. I have seen a growing acceptance of, and even a yearning for, the return to a more authoritarian style of government. After all, it is the authoritarians, not regular people, who know best what to do in situations like this.
In May, this troubling trend found its expression in a parliamentary and presidential election in which the nationalist party, the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization (VMRO-DPMNE), emerged the indisputable victor, winning 58 seats in the country’s 120-seat Parliament, and the country’s Presidency as well.
Any person who has followed Macedonian politics in recent years will remember VMRO-DPMNE, the party that for the decade between 2006 and 2016 held the Republic of Macedonia in an increasingly authoritarian grip. They will remember that it cannibalized the country’s democratic institutions with such speed and such force that even the usually-reserved European Commission warned of the dangers of “state capture.” They will remember that the party’s former leader, then-Prime Minister Nikola Gruevski, filled the capital of Skopje with buildings and oversized monuments celebrating Macedonian greatness, a move that alienated the country’s minorities, angered its neighbors, and derailed longstanding efforts to enter the EU, not to mention emptying state coffers of over 600 millions euros while a third of the country remained unemployed. They will remember that Prime Minister Gruevski installed his closest allies as the heads of government ministries, including his own cousin as the director of state security services. They will remember that the security services spied on thousands of people, and that the recordings of its wiretaps ultimately came to light, in 2015. They will remember the tens of thousands who took to the streets in protest, demanding that the government step down. They will remember that Gruevski soon after fled to Hungary, where he has avoided accountability ever since, living under the protection of fellow European strongman Victor Orbán.
If such a person is still following events in North Macedonia, they will notice that, following the elections in May, the new leadership of VMRO-DPMNE has in many ways followed in the footsteps of the old. They will notice that it has reawakened the same conflicts with neighboring Greece and Bulgaria, keeping ethnic nationalism constantly inflamed within North Macedonia, while once again threatening the chances of the country joining the European Union. They will notice that the new leadership has installed numerous of the same government ministers who served in high office under Gruevski while cutting back the number of leadership positions held by representatives of minority communities.
And yet, even the closest follower of North Macedonian politics may not necessarily perceive the immense amount of energy that the party leadership, and those affiliated with it, have expended, and continue to expend, towards silencing, intimidating, and sowing distrust in human rights actors and media actors, with Xhabir Deralla foremost among them. Even the closest follower of North Macedonian politics can perhaps be forgiven for not having the time, or energy, to keep track of the sheer number of attacks against just this one person, who has been so relentless and so public in his pursuit of human rights that he has become a perfect target. Indeed, every passing week seems to bring a new legal threat against him, a new conspiracy theory about him, or simply a cavalcade of social media posts that fantasize about the violence that may finally be visited upon him under this new regime.
I would like, therefore, to take this opportunity to try and sort through some of these threats, (to the extent that this is even possible), to say why they matter, and what can be done about them.
I will begin by saying that Deralla is not alone in the harassment he faces. While the situation of human rights defenders and those working in the media in North Macedonia did improve between the years of 2017 and 2024 –(during the period directly after VMRO-DPMNE’s decade in power) – this is not to say that the situation has resolved. In fact, some forms of threats and pressure have accelerated, including a type of legal harassment called a “SLAPP” (or Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation).
Deralla faces just this type of harassment, having been sued by none other than the President of VMRO-DPMNE, Hristijan Mickoski – an extremely powerful man at the time he initiated his suit, who has only become more powerful after the May elections, as he is now the country’s Prime Minister. Asfor the substance of the cases, they regard an article published on February 23, 2022 in an outlet that Deralla founded, Frontline.mk, which contained allegations that a close member of Mickoski’s family had acquired valuable real estate in Skopje. Notably, Deralla did not write or edit this article, nor did the article originate with Frontline.mk. Rather, Frontline.mk was one of numerous media outlets that republished the story from an original media outlet,Indeks.mk, which was clearly credited. Mickoski’s original complaint, which I have read, even concedes this very point.
But my purpose here is not to analyze Mickoski’s reasoning as conveyed in the court documents, even as tempting as it is to do so. Such an activity is,unfortunately, risky business in North Macedonia. What’s more, as is so often the case in matters of legal harassment, what matters is not the content of the case that matters, but the context of the case. What matters is that the case takes place in the context of rising authoritarianism and a resurgent radical party. What matters is that it takes place in a context of a legal system that is extremely politicized, where judges themselves report feeling pressure to decide cases in a certain way. (And, while I cannot read the minds of the judges presiding over Deralla’s cases, I cannot imagine that they are unaware that Mickoski’s lawyer, Pance Toshkovski, who has to date filed two lawsuits over the article in question, has now been appointed the country’s Minister of Interior, an extremely powerful and relevant role.) What matters is that it takes place in a context in which a high-ranking politician would target a member of the media and human rights community personally, and spin conspiracy theories about them, continually, in public.
As an example, I offer Mickoski’s celebration of the court’s verdict against Deralla, published in a Facebook post of June 20, 2023.
The Facebook post, seen below, begins with the following statement: “Вака изгледа срамот од лагите на власта, уште еднаш осудени се дека клеветат,” or “This is what the shame of the lies of the government looks like, once again they are convicted of slander.” In this way, Mickoski implies that he did not take an individual journalist to court, but rather the entire government. In fact, Mickoski does not refer to Deralla by name in the post, but rather to “еден од тие медиумски слуги,” (“one of those media servants,”) of the political parties that were at the time in government.
This framing plays on a conspiracy theory that has been circulating about Deralla for some time – that while he is not, and never has been, in government, and more specifically is not, and has never been, in the leadership of the Social Democratic Union of Macedonia or SDSM, he is either “a mouthpiece” of that political party (a “media servant,”) or could even be “the one who is pulling the strings behind the scenes.” Such a statement, and such a theory, ignores the fact that Deralla has written highly critically of the SDSM numerous times, and works with journalists who do so as well. For example, Deralla is highly critical of “the political inertia” of the social democrats while in power, and has criticized them for their stance towards “efficacy vs. values” and “the neglect of the judiciary and other critical reforms.” And these are only tiny fragments of Deralla’s critical writings and investigations on all governmental and party policies and practices in the past and now.
Mickoski’s framing of Deralla as a shadowy figure in connection with the then-ruling parties also appeared in a Facebook post he published earlier in the same year, also regarding the news story Deralla’s outlet republished. The post, seen below, is conspiratorial in tone, including the statement, “ДУИ нареди, а СДСМ исполни,” or “DUI orders, the SDSM fulfills.” This statement plays on another popular trope – that the party of the Social Democratic Union of Macedonia (SDSM) does not truly represent the interests of North Macedonia, and especially does not represent the interests of the ethnic Macedonian constituency. Rather, it is a puppet of the much smaller, and yet somehow more powerful, Democratic Union for Integration, or DUI, which represents the ethnic Albanian constituency and served in coalition with the SDSM. Mickoski follows this by referring to Deralla as “медиумите блиски на” or “media close to the SDSM,” the entire post working to imply the two are one and the same.
To see such language used by a high official on social media is of course troubling. But what is equally if not more troubling is that, in making his case against Xhabir Deralla, (a well-known human rights leader), Mickoski claimed that his rights were violated not only under local Macedonian law, but under the European Convention on Human Rights. The ECHR is, of course, a document that was crafted to protect people from the overwhelming power of the state, not the other way around. But in this case, Deralla has been equated with the government itself, while the president of a powerful political party, who is now the Prime Minister of the country, somehow takes the position of David facing Goliath.
If this strikes the reader as confusing, and even exhausting, please know that that is largely the point of legal harassment. It is not to win an argument based on logic and the law, but to confuse, to exhaust, and to isolate an activist from their support networks by cloaking them in a cloud of suspicion that no rational person can make sense of. Also know that the use of the ECHR in this way matters particularly in North Macedonia, because so many living in the country are already suspicious of the very concept of human rights. To see human rights law used by a politician associated with an authoritarian party, and against a well-known human rights leader like Deralla, only serves as further proof to the wider population that human rights are merely political tools, devoid of any real meaning.
What’s more, legal actions and inflammatory social media posts by leaders like Mickoski have the effect of encouraging others to make threats against Deralla, to spin conspiracy theories about him, and to fantasize about what may become of him under the new VMRO-DPMNE regime.
One Facebook post, written by a member of the Macedonian diaspora, wove an elaborate origin story for Deralla, falsely stating that Deralla was not from Macedonia at all, but from Kosovo, and that he had long worked for Macedonia’s destruction and the creation of a “Greater Albania.”
On another Facebook post, which appeared under an article written by Deralla about propaganda and attacks in the media, a comment read Биди видлив гнидо, куршумот кај и да е ќе те стигне, or “Be visible you scumbag, the bullet will reach you soon enough.”
In the months before the recent election, I saw an increasing number of hateful and violent fantasies spun on the Facebook page of Civil-Centre for Freedom. On a post concerning a press-conference statement by Deralla delivered in March 2024, on the subject of election monitoring, one comment threatened him with a “bullet in the head” and with “people’s judgment”. Another contained a collage of portraits in which the “bullet in the head” was aimed at a number of domestic and foreign political and public figures, such as presidents of Ukraine and North Macedonia, the US Ambassador to North Macedonia, and Deralla’s colleague Dehran Muratov, along with Deralla himself. Others comments I saw in the run-up to the election fantasized about what should be done to Deralla if and when VMRO-DPMNE should come to power. One commenter fantasized that he should be decapitated, that he should be dismembered, that he should be sent to the island of Golem Grad, an island that is known for its many snakes who would eat him alive. Another countered that sending him to this island of snakes could present problems, as Deralla himself, ever the bogeyman, would himself eat the snakes.
Some of the links and screenshots can be seen in the article published in Civil Media.
In addition to these attacks that are out in the open are the endless rumors that hint at a fate that is even worse, that may or may not connect to things that can be seen in the official media. For instance, I will see in one context that there is a “list” of those who will (or should) be made to suffer if and when the nationalists return to power. In one case, the announcement that there was such a list appeared in the official Twitter feed of a radical Macedonian party. This is then followed by rumors about who is on the list. (Deralla is always on the list.) I can spend days searching for evidence, for the original threat, and for the specific party that is said to have created the list in the first place, all the while the rumors continue and escalate.
And then, I do find a list, like the one seen below — referred to as a post-election “black notebook” — in which Deralla appears in first place.
This list was posted by Milenko Nedelkovski, a journalist and TV host known for his extremely controversial media appearances, but it is left unclear if Nedelkovski himself compiled it, or if he is simply reporting it, and the exact fate being called for. I am told that it is understood locally to be an execution list, and I have little doubt that this is true, but it is worded just vaguely enough that its author can maintain deniability, and just vaguely enough as to spark yet more rumors and violent fantasies that are then replicated in conversation and openly on-line. (Because, remember, what matters is the context of threats — in this case a context of constant death threats and a resurgence of genocidal ideology that can be seen not only in North Macedonia, but in multiple places in the Balkans.) The examples of these threats against Derala are truly endless:
And why does all of this matter? Why does this matter, particularly, when Deralla himself does not appear to have been deterred by these threats?
It matters, because, as we know, there are only so many hours in the day, and threats such as these do keep a human rights leader very busy with cataloging, reporting, tracing, and, in the case of SLAPPs, with retaining legal counsel and mounting defense after defense, which can also of course be costly. During all of that time, the person who is being targeted cannot do their core work. Just as importantly, attacks such as these have what human rights and media freedom organizations sometimes refer to as a “chilling effect.”
That is, they act to discourage others from associating with the person in question, or from doing work similar to them, or even from commenting positively on a Facebook post for fear of also becoming a target. This is something to which I can speak personally – that, in recent years, friends and colleagues have told me I should not be quite so open that I work with Deralla, that I should be more careful. Indeed, it is a very uncareful thing to write in the way I am at present.
I promised at the beginning of this article that I would say something about what can be done about these attacks.
Here, I would like to restate that it is a wonderful thing that the South East Europe Association has recognized Deralla’s work, as to do so provides a much-needed layer of protection. Other organizations devoted to human rights and media freedom should follow suit, keeping in mind that it is a good thing, and should not be confusing at all, when a human rights leader is also a media leader. Meaning, Media freedom organizations should mention the attacks against Deralla in their reports, even though he is also known as a human rights leader. And human rights organizations should mention the attacks against him as well, even if this harassment is directed at him in his capacity as a media professional.
It is crucial to remember, again, that these attacks happen in a certain context, that of the Balkans, where autocratic leaders have risen by crafting their strategies along multiple fronts, including (but not limited to) the use of propaganda and disinformation that can mobilize thousands to hate and even to kill. It is crucial to remember, and support, those among us, like Deralla, who are capable of and committed to meeting the challenge of rising autocracy by also working on multiple fronts, and not just one.
Heather Roberson is a human rights expert and educator, and co-author with Harvey Pekar of the graphic novel Macedonia: What Does it Take to Stop a War? (Random House/Villard, 2008). She received her undergraduate training in Peace and Conflict Studies from the University of California at Berkeley; a Master’s Degree in Human Rights from Columbia University; and an additional Certificate of Advanced Study of Eastern and Central Europe from Columbia University’s Harriman Institute. She has been studying North Macedonia since 2003 and is currently working on an oral history project about Yugoslavia during the 1980s.
Illustration: Photo by Jon Tyson on Unsplash
