Editor’s note (April 11, 2026):
This analysis was originally published in Macedonian on April 6, 2026, ahead of Hungary’s parliamentary elections. While some developments have evolved in the meantime, the article is published in English to provide context on the narratives, signals, and concerns shaping the pre-election environment.

By Xhabir Deralla

Allegations of a serious security incident in Serbia—explosives reportedly discovered near a gas pipeline supplying Hungary—have opened the door not only to alarming questions, but also to dangerous narratives with the potential to influence political processes across the region.

According to The Guardian, the incident occurred just days before Hungary’s parliamentary elections, immediately raising the political temperature. Accusations, suspicions, and speculation are already circulating in the public sphere—including claims that this may be a possible “false flag” operation, with North Macedonia also being implicated.

A source from CIVIL Media within the security expert community warns that there is a real possibility the incident could be instrumentalized to blame Ukraine, in order to further amplify the already aggressive propaganda narratives of Viktor Orbán against official Kyiv.

But this is precisely where the complex and dangerous game between facts and their political interpretation begins.

What is known—and what doesn’t add up

Official Belgrade claims that explosives were found near critical energy infrastructure, with the potential to cause serious consequences for energy stability and security in the country and the wider region.

However, according to CIVIL Media’s sources, this version raises serious doubts.

“These claims do not fit the basic logic of how sabotage operations against critical infrastructure are carried out. This is not how such operations are typically set up and executed,” our source says.

Experience suggests that this “incident” is not well-prepared even from a propaganda standpoint—it simply sounds unconvincing.

“It is possible to randomly find leftover ammunition from past conflicts—but not this kind of deliberately placed material with an alleged strategic objective,” the source adds.

In a region where many people have military or security experience, such claims fail to inspire trust.

On the other hand, regardless of how naive a propaganda narrative may sound, what matters is how aggressively it is pushed into the public sphere—to generate confusion, distrust, and fear.

Ultimately, this narrative serves Orbán’s interests, as it can easily be repackaged into a new wave of propaganda targeting Ukraine—this time with an added “security” dimension.

The timing is no coincidence – an operation to save Orbán, even by delaying the elections

This story is emerging at an exceptionally sensitive political moment—just days before Hungary’s crucial elections.

In such circumstances, any security incident—real or constructed—automatically acquires political weight.

It is therefore no surprise that political and security analysts are already pointing to the possibility of a so-called “false flag” operation—a tactic used to shift blame onto another actor or manipulate public perception.

Alongside the official information, claims are spreading on social media about a broader, coordinated operation to save Orbán, linked to business and media networks close to him, with alleged involvement of actors from Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and North Macedonia.

According to these claims, the ultimate goal is not only political mobilization, but the creation of conditions for a potential postponement of the electoral process in Hungary if things go south for Orbán. At this stage, these claims have not been confirmed by credible media or institutions. However, their emergence—at this particular moment and within this context—cannot be dismissed as accidental.

If these allegations prove to be true, it could mean only one thing—that Orbán no longer fears defeat, but knows that his electoral loss is inevitable. In other words, he may already be activating a scenario in which defeat cannot be avoided through electoral fraud or vote-buying alone, but requires the deployment of “heavy artillery.”

In that case, the security incident would be just one element of a broader strategy—one that includes crisis manufacturing, mobilization through fear, and the opening of space for extraordinary political moves.

Information warfare in real time: Skopje via Budapest

What we are witnessing is an intensive information and psychological operation unfolding in real time.

Anti-Ukraine narratives lie at the core of Orbán’s pre-election strategy—supported by the Kremlin, synchronized through regional proxy structures, and amplified by the global far-right, including MAGA networks.

Within this architecture, the roles of Belgrade and Skopje are becoming increasingly defined, suggesting that “cross-border cooperation” has long extended beyond political partnership. They are already functioning as operational channels.

An additional layer of concern is created by intensified political contacts between Budapest and government structures in the region, including visits by North Macedonia’s top officials since the beginning of the year—most notably the recent meeting between Hristijan Mickoski and Hungary’s strongman.

On its own, this is not evidence. But when combined with other elements, it becomes part of a broader pattern that cannot be ignored. Here, Mickoski becomes part of a mosaic that is already coming into clear focus.

Propaganda artillery

In such conditions, narratives do not need to be true to be effective. It is enough that they are intense, dramatic, and politically usable—to shape public perception, create confusion, and paralyze the public.

In such an atmosphere, the electoral process becomes vulnerable—not only to manipulation, but to devaluation and delegitimization. This can significantly affect voter turnout, especially among undecided and opposition-leaning voters.

The broader context of long-standing political, media, and economic ties between Budapest and certain circles in the Balkans cannot—and must not—be ignored.

Businessman Péter Schatz, part of Orbán’s closest circle, has long maintained a media presence in North Macedonia. These structures have been actively involved in propaganda operations in key political processes—from the Prespa process and efforts to obstruct Euro-Atlantic integration, to attacks against the Special Prosecutor’s Office, the fall of the SDSM-led government, and the sustained pro-Russian messaging in the country’s public discourse.

The operation has begun—how far will it go?

Russian and Serbian influence in the country’s media space is well documented—and in recent years has operated with significantly less resistance, and increasingly with support from those in power.

In such an environment, the infrastructure for coordinated information operations is already in place and can be—or may already be—activated for propaganda campaigns and electoral influence, including in Hungary. And that is precisely why this no longer looks like an isolated incident or a random media fabrication.

It increasingly resembles the activation of a pre-prepared mechanism.

If this scenario proves accurate, we are not dealing with an incident—nor even with conventional political support—but with a controlled escalation serving a clear political objective. The question is no longer whether an operation exists. The question is: how far will it go?

This article is based on media reports, expert sources, and publicly available social media content. Some of the claims have not been independently verified and remain subject to ongoing analysis and verification. The content reflects the views of the author.

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