By Xhabir Deralla
The language of war often reveals more than the wars themselves.
When U.S. Secretary of War Pete Hegseth declared that “we didn’t start this war, but under President Trump we are finishing it,” careful observers of Russia found the phrase strikingly familiar.
“We did not start this so-called war. On the contrary, we are trying to finish it,” Vladimir Putin had said a few years earlier, after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
The similarity in rhetoric is disturbing. It illustrates how easily political language in wartime can be used to shift responsibility and legitimize the use of force. In democratic societies, this should prompt serious public debate, because such formulations gradually blur the line between aggression, defense, and military intervention.
But similarity in words does not mean equality between conflicts.
The more important question, however, is not the similarity of rhetoric but how the Kremlin positions itself within this crisis — and what that reveals about Russia’s geopolitical priorities.
Russia is waging a brutal war of aggression against Ukraine — marked by territorial occupation, annexations, mass war crimes, and a parallel hybrid war against democracies in Europe and beyond. The conflict involving the United States, Israel, and Iran, however controversial and legally contested it may be, does not amount to an imperial invasion aimed at permanent territorial occupation — at least not yet.
Blurring these two realities is precisely one of the Kremlin’s preferred propaganda techniques. In the case of Iran, however, the narrative seems to play into Moscow’s hands without the Kremlin having to lift a finger — or so it appears.
Yet the situation is more complex. Sources within U.S. intelligence services report that Russia has provided Iran with information that could potentially assist in targeting American ships, aircraft, and military bases in the region.
Such ambiguity — playing on two boards simultaneously — is typical of the Kremlin: enough support to maintain influence, but without taking direct risks.
Russia knows well that a direct confrontation with the United States would be dangerous — especially at a moment when the Russian military is already exhausted by the prolonged war in Ukraine.
The reaction of President Donald Trump to a question about whether Russia was helping Iran was also highly revealing. When a reporter asked whether Moscow was assisting Iranian forces in targeting U.S. military assets, Trump dismissed the question as “stupid,” adding that it was “an easy problem compared to what we’re doing.”
This response raises serious questions. If Russian intelligence is indeed helping Iranian forces, it could represent a direct risk to American soldiers and their allies in the region. Dismissing such a question as irrelevant or “stupid” only adds to the complexity of the situation.
At a separate White House briefing, press secretary Karoline Leavitt also downplayed Russia’s role. She stated that Russia’s activity “clearly does not make any difference with respect to the military operations in Iran because we are completely decimating them.”
If the crude vocabulary that has become characteristic of the current U.S. administration is set aside, the statement remains telling.
Russian intelligence could potentially cause fatal losses among American soldiers or their allies. To claim that such involvement “makes no difference” either underestimates the risk — or suggests that political rhetoric once again overrides careful security considerations.
Moscow’s behavior in this crisis fits a broader pattern.
Russia often creates the impression of strong geopolitical alliances, but it rarely sacrifices its own interests for its partners. The Kremlin rarely — if ever — defends its “allies.”
One of the most striking examples is Armenia — a formal Russian ally within the Collective Security Treaty Organization — which was effectively left alone when Azerbaijan took control of Nagorno-Karabakh. In Syria, Russian support was also carefully calibrated — sufficient to maintain influence, but limited to what served the Kremlin’s interests.
Russia supports partners as long as doing so is useful and relatively inexpensive. But it rarely sacrifices anything for them.
In the current crisis, another factor is particularly important: the relationship between Vladimir Putin and Donald Trump. For the Kremlin, improving relations with Washington — especially if that means weakening sanctions or reducing Western support for Ukraine — carries far greater strategic value than demonstrating loyalty to Iran.
Tehran is a partner. But it is not a priority. And Putin will not risk losing Trump for Iran.
From the very beginning, it became clear that the Middle East war brought Russia certain short-term economic advantages. Rising oil prices generate additional revenue for the Russian economy, which remains under pressure from sanctions and enormous military expenditures.
However, this relief is only temporary. The war in Ukraine continues to drain Russia’s economy and military machine. No economic benefit from the Middle East war will provide enough resources to replenish Putin’s war machine sufficiently to crush Ukraine’s resistance or Europe’s growing resolve to stop Russia’s aggression.
Under such circumstances, the Kremlin’s strategy is clear: limited support for Iran, careful avoidance of direct confrontation with the United States, and the exploitation of the crisis for economic and political gain.
For Moscow, every crisis is an opportunity. This logic has shaped not only Russia’s post-Soviet behavior, but reflects a much longer tradition of strategic opportunism in its foreign policy.
In today’s geopolitical landscape, friendships and alliances have a very limited shelf life. The Kremlin’s strategy thrives on ambiguity, double games, and calculated opportunism.
In the end, the rhetoric of “ending wars” — used by many of the major players on the global stage — often reveals less about peace than about power.
In the Kremlin’s geopolitical playbook, alliances are temporary, loyalty is conditional, and crises are opportunities. It is a logic that may well outlive Vladimir Putin himself.
The only constant is the pursuit of power.
Digital tools and AI-assisted research support were used in the preparation of this analysis.
Illustration: AI-generated with the assistance of ChatGPT