By Xhabir Deralla
In a March 13 interview with Fox News, U.S. President Donald Trump described the war in Ukraine in language strikingly close to Moscow’s line—once again. The comment appeared out of nowhere, raised by Trump himself near the end of the interview and seemingly catching even the otherwise accommodating host off guard.
When a political narrative appears repeatedly—even when it is not part of the discussion—it stops looking accidental. The interview itself may appear to be just another episode in the endless churn of political media. Yet, taken together with years of rhetoric and policy positions, it raises a question that intelligence professionals, analysts, and diplomats have quietly debated for nearly a decade.
If someone consistently behaves in ways that advance the strategic objectives of the Russian Federation, what conclusions should be drawn—even if the person insists otherwise?
There is an old expression: “If it walks like a duck, quacks like a duck, it’s probably a duck.”
In politics, this is often called the duck test. It does not rely on secret files or courtroom standards of proof. Instead, it looks at patterns of behavior. And the patterns matter. Across multiple political cycles, Trump’s positions have repeatedly aligned with core strategic goals of the Kremlin and its leader, Vladimir Putin. Put simply, Mr. Trump does not pass the duck test.
The evidence lies in a pattern of positions and statements that consistently serve Moscow’s strategic interests.
These patterns include undermining NATO. Few institutions stand more squarely in the way of Russian geopolitical ambitions than the NATO. Trump has repeatedly questioned the alliance’s mutual defense commitment—Article 5—and suggested that the United States might not defend certain allies. From Moscow’s perspective, nothing would be more valuable than weakening NATO’s credibility.
Further, these patterns invite Kremlin narratives. Russian propaganda has long attempted to reframe its invasion of Ukraine as defensive or justified. Trump’s rhetoric has at times echoed versions of these narratives, shifting attention away from Russian aggression and toward alleged provocations by others.
Trump and similar characters across the authoritarian universe are targeting allies instead of the aggressor. Another recurring pattern has been rhetorical hostility toward democratic partners—European governments, NATO members, and Ukrainian leadership—while showing notable restraint when discussing Russia.
These narratives are aimed at blocking aid to Ukraine. Efforts to slow, block, or question Western support for Ukraine directly benefit the Kremlin’s military and political objectives. Praise for Putin, and contempt for democratic leaders has been normalized. Trump’s public comments about Putin have often been unusually complimentary compared to his treatment of leaders from democratic allied states.
In this grotesque sovereignist and “great again” universe there are no demands on the aggressor. Perhaps most striking is the asymmetry: harsh demands on Ukraine and Western allies, and comparatively few on Russia itself. Individually, any of these positions could be explained as political preference, strategic disagreement, or ideological worldview. However, they form a pattern.
Intelligence professionals distinguish between two different categories. A witting agent knowingly works for a foreign power. An asset, however, may simply be someone whose behavior can be exploited. There is also an older term—often used during the Cold War—“useful idiot.” It refers to individuals whose ambitions, vanity, or political calculations lead them to advance another country’s interests without formal recruitment.
This logic is not new. During the Cold War, Soviet intelligence services described influence operations as “active measures.” These included disinformation campaigns, political manipulation, and the cultivation of sympathetic voices in Western societies. The goal was not always to recruit formal spies. Often it was enough to encourage political figures whose ambitions, grievances, or ideological preferences already aligned with Soviet objectives. In such cases, influence worked not through control, but through predictable behavior.
Intent, in such cases, may matter less than outcomes. If a politician’s actions consistently weaken Western alliances, amplify Kremlin narratives, and obstruct support for a country resisting Russian aggression, the effect on national security is the same regardless of motive.
Supporters of Trump often point out that no definitive document proving he is a Russian agent has ever surfaced. There is no “smoking gun” in other words. That is true. But intelligence analysis rarely relies on cinematic evidence. Instead, it examines patterns, incentives, and strategic consequences.
Foreign influence operations rarely require formal recruitment. Often they rely on amplification, flattery, financial entanglements, or simply the predictable behavior of political actors whose goals align with those of an adversary. The result can look remarkably similar to direct influence—even when it is not.
The issue is not merely about one politician. It is about the vulnerability of democratic systems to foreign influence. Modern influence operations do not always operate through spies in trench coats. They operate through narratives, incentives, media ecosystems, and political polarization. In such an environment, the most valuable asset a foreign power can have is not necessarily a secret agent.
Sometimes it is simply a politician whose behavior consistently produces the outcomes the Kremlin desires. And when that happens, the old saying becomes difficult to ignore.
If it walks like a duck, and quacks like a duck…
At some point, democracies must stop debating the duck’s intentions and start paying attention to its consequences.
The views expressed in this commentary are solely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of any organization with which the author is affiliated.