By Xhabir Deralla

The escape of Blerim Ramadani, a former member of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), provides an excellent opportunity for propaganda machines from every corner of the political jungle to display the full range of their talents and capabilities.

To recap: Ramadani was arrested in July at the Jazhincë border crossing between North Macedonia and Kosovo, on the basis of a notice issued by Serbia through Interpol. Serbia based its request on suspicions that Ramadani had committed war crimes in the Nerodime region of Kosovo in 1999, when he was a member of the KLA.

North Macedonian judge Pajazit Pajaziti ordered Ramadani to remain under house arrest until 16 August. He escaped shortly before the measure was due to expire, allegedly after learning that the court was preparing to order his detention and that extradition to Serbia might follow.

What came next was an avalanche of mutual accusations and attempts to shift responsibility between the government and the opposition, but also among institutions controlled by VMRO-DPMNE.

Justice Minister Igor Filkov blamed Judge Pajazit Pajaziti. Prime Minister Hristijan Mickoski blamed the “little notebooks” of SDSM and DUI. The head of the Directorate for the Execution of Sanctions, Aleksandar Pandov, told journalists to seek answers from the Ministry of Interior.

The government coalition partner VLEN remained restrained after Ramadani’s escape, although following his arrest, Arben Taravari and First Deputy Prime Minister Izet Mexhiti had said that efforts were being made to secure his release. The opposition SDSM demanded accountability from Interior Minister Panche Toshkovski. The Criminal Court also pointed to the Ministry of Interior, while the Judicial Council set up an entire commission to examine the case.

In short, the usual North Macedonian political and judicial mess, heavily charged with nationalism — sometimes coded in the rhetoric of politicians and media, and sometimes expressed quite openly on social media.

And amid all this confusion, the frantic flight from responsibility and the simultaneous sprint for political points, almost no one stopped — or perhaps wanted to stop — to look at the situation from a somewhat different angle.

How, and to what extent, are international mechanisms assessed not only in terms of the obligations they create, but also in terms of protection against possible political and other forms of abuse?

It is extremely important to emphasize that this article does not attempt to resolve the case of Blerim Ramadani’s arrest, detention and escape. Rather, the case serves as an occasion to examine several important features of the international mechanism represented by the widely known Interpol system: the organization’s major successes, but also several alarming examples of political abuse.

Nevertheless, it is important to examine this and similar cases through the perspectives presented here in order to ask whether the North Macedonian police and other institutions fully understand their functions and powers — and whether they may be susceptible to political and other forms of manipulation and pressure, both from abroad and from within the country.

The popular image of Interpol bears little resemblance to reality

The commonly held perception of what Interpol actually is bears little resemblance to reality.

Interpol is often imagined as some sort of special police force that pursues criminals across national borders and even across continents. In reality, Interpol is not a police force at all.

It is an international organization established to “ensure and promote the widest possible mutual assistance between all criminal police authorities.”

In other words, Interpol is not a supranational police service or law-enforcement agency. It is an international organization that serves as an instrument for cooperation among the law-enforcement authorities of participating states.

More precisely, Interpol provides a standardized and streamlined system for sharing information, enabling cooperation among states and their law-enforcement bodies in combating cross-border and international crime.

An Interpol notice is not binding

Interpol is an important international mechanism whose membership includes 196 countries and which maintains extensive databases relating to crimes including murder, rape and fraud.

One of its most important — and at the same time most sensitive — functions is that member states can request international alerts, including notices seeking the location and provisional arrest of wanted persons.

But such notices are not binding. Yes, that is precisely the point: notices circulated through Interpol DO NOT automatically compel a country to make an arrest.

On its website, Interpol is very clear when answering whether the organization itself seeks or arrests individuals: No. They are wanted by a country or an international tribunal. INTERPOL cannot compel law-enforcement authorities in any country to arrest someone who is the subject of a Red Notice.

Each member country decides what legal value it gives to a Red Notice and the authority of its law-enforcement officers to make arrests.

This does not mean that Interpol, as an international mechanism for combating crime, lacks real power or influence. Quite the opposite. But it is essential to distinguish clearly between Interpol’s role and responsibilities and those of the relevant institutions at national level.

A major force in the global fight against crime: Interpol’s internationally recognized operations

There is no question that Interpol represents an important force in the global fight against crime.

At a time when crime has become globalized, increasingly complex and increasingly sophisticated, Interpol is an exceptionally important instrument for information exchange and coordination among law-enforcement bodies in the fight against organized crime, drug and human trafficking, war crimes and terrorism.

One widely known example is Operation Libertad, in which almost 350 potential victims of sexual exploitation and forced labour were rescued in April 2018. The operation involved police action in 13 countries across the Caribbean, Central America and South America.

Interpol helped coordinate raids and searches during which, in addition to rescuing victims including minors, authorities seized documents, equipment, mobile phones and cash.

Another illustrative example is Operation Neptune III, carried out in the summer of 2021 across five Mediterranean countries: Algeria, France, Italy, Spain and Tunisia.

During the summer season, thousands of people and vehicles cross these countries’ international borders every day by land, sea and air. These routes are also used by criminals, human traffickers and terrorists.

According to Interpol, Operation Neptune III resulted in the arrest of 29 people on charges ranging from terrorism and drug trafficking to vehicle theft, crimes against children, sexual violence, fraud and human trafficking. Authorities seized 17.5 kilograms of cocaine with an estimated street value of €1.2 million, more than 20,000 ecstasy tablets, 189 kilograms of tobacco products, three luxury cars, two motorcycles, one handgun and 29 hunting rifles, as well as more than €260,000 in cash.

The “dark side” of Interpol: The heavy price paid by victims of political persecution

But this international mechanism also has a “dark side”. Interpol’s systems have repeatedly been accused of being exploited by authoritarian regimes as instruments against political opponents, critics or individuals linked to countries with which those regimes have unresolved disputes or political tensions.

Authoritarian governments have sought to misuse the Red Notice system, effectively turning Interpol into a long-range instrument capable of reaching beyond their own borders.

By criminalizing dissenters, political opponents or other individuals abroad and attempting to place Interpol’s mechanisms at the service of their political agendas, such governments act in ways that are contrary to democracy, the rule of law and respect for human rights and freedoms.

There are numerous examples of controversial Red Notices and international requests.

One prominent case is Bill Browder, the former Russia-based financier who became a critic of Vladimir Putin and a prominent anti-corruption advocate.

Among the many cases cited in discussions of Russia’s alleged misuse of Interpol mechanisms is that of financial expert Nikita Kulachenkov, who worked with the Russian opposition on investigations into corruption connected to the Kremlin.

Others who have been sought through Interpol mechanisms include Benny Wenda, an Indonesian activist and refugee; Eerik-Niiles Kross, an Estonian politician known for opposing Russian interference in Eastern Europe; Hakeem al-Araibi, a Bahraini footballer and refugee living in Australia; Yidiresi Aishan, a Uyghur activist who spoke out against the Chinese government; and Doğan Akhanlı, a Turkish human-rights activist, among many others.

The price paid by people subjected to politically motivated pursuit through international law-enforcement mechanisms can be immense. Their reputations and professional careers suffer, as do their families. Those targeted may live in constant fear that an international law-enforcement mechanism could ultimately return them to an authoritarian state where they could face imprisonment — or even death.

Russia has frequently been cited in international debates over political misuse of Interpol’s mechanisms. The Kremlin has been accused of generating a disproportionately large number of politically controversial requests compared with many other states.

Serbia’s “White Book” and Interpol: A long-running political confrontation with Kosovo and the case of Agim Çeku

One country that has attracted the attention of regional and international journalists and experts examining possible misuse of Interpol is Serbia. By 2017, authorities in Belgrade reportedly had 157 citizens of Kosovo listed in Serbia’s so-called “White Book” as persons to be arrested if they entered Serbian territory.

The list included numerous former KLA fighters, but also politicians and public figures who had no direct involvement with the KLA during the 1999 war.

Some Kosovo citizens listed in Serbia’s “White Book” were also sought by Serbian authorities through Interpol mechanisms. Among those who at one point appeared on Serbia’s international wanted list was Agim Çeku — in 2006, while he was serving as prime minister. The Interpol-related notice concerning Çeku subsequently became the subject of considerable controversy, provoking strong reactions in Serbian and pro-Serbian media across the region.

Interpol responded with a statement rejecting some of the claims made publicly by Serbian officials and media. The organization said that this position had also been formally communicated to Serbian authorities in March 2006.

“Contrary to media reports and public statements by certain officials in Serbia, INTERPOL did not ‘cancel’ Serbia’s arrest warrant, as INTERPOL cannot and does not seek to cancel arrest warrants issued by national courts. However, under its rules, INTERPOL is required not to circulate or register information, or otherwise cooperate with national authorities, where the requested cooperation is not compatible with the organization’s rules,” the Interpol statement said.

Belgrade’s “consistent” cooperation with the Lukashenko regime at Interpol’s expense: The case of journalist Andrei Hniot

Another internationally known example concerns Serbia’s cooperation with the regime of Alexander Lukashenko in Belarus in a case involving an Interpol notice.

According to a Freedom House report published on 11 July 2024, Serbian police detained Belarusian activist and journalist Andrei Hniot at Belgrade airport on 31 October 2023 on the basis of an allegedly abusive Interpol Red Notice requested by the Belarusian authorities.

Hniot faced what his supporters described as fabricated tax-evasion charges. He had come under scrutiny from the Belarusian authorities after helping organize athletes opposed to Lukashenko and cooperating with independent media during the pro-democracy protests in Belarus in 2020. After his arrest in Belgrade, Interpol’s oversight body informed Hniot’s lawyers that access to the notice had been blocked.

That, however, did not end the proceedings in Serbia. Hniot spent seven months in Serbian detention, after which the Higher Court in Belgrade approved his extradition to Belarus in a ruling issued in May 2024. At the time Freedom House published its report, Hniot was under house arrest in Serbia. He appealed the Serbian court’s decision, arguing that being returned to Belarus would lead to his “painful death”.

Belarusian opposition leader Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya publicly appealed to the Serbian authorities not to extradite Hniot to Lukashenko’s regime. At the time this article was originally published, a final decision by the court in Belgrade was expected on 27 August 2024.

• Update, 23 September 2026: On August 27, 2024, the Belgrade Court of Appeal overturned the decision approving Andrei Hniot’s extradition to Belarus and returned the case for retrial, citing deficiencies in the first-instance proceedings. Hniot had already been removed from INTERPOL’s wanted system earlier that month. On October 31, 2024, he was released from house arrest and subsequently allowed to leave Serbia. PEN International later reported that the extradition proceedings technically remained open, despite Hniot having left the country.

Political vendetta: Authoritarian regimes and the recurring misuse of Interpol

Even when Interpol recognizes that a Red Notice is problematic and blocks access to an individual’s file or otherwise intervenes, the damage may already have been done, according to Freedom House. Using Interpol mechanisms for political vendettas can result in direct violations of fundamental human rights and freedoms — principles that are also embedded in the foundational framework of this international police-cooperation organization.

A significant number of individuals have found themselves, and continue to find themselves, caught in the crossfire between the legitimate fight against crime and the abusive use of international institutions by authoritarian regimes. It is important to stress that Interpol is not the only international mechanism vulnerable to exploitation or weaponization by powerful states.

Russia has repeatedly been accused of exploiting not only Interpol mechanisms, but also institutions and bodies within the United Nations, the OSCE and other international organizations.

The model established by the Kremlin has been followed in different forms by other authoritarian regimes. Such governments exploit international law and institutions systematically and persistently, undermining trust in global institutions, justice and the rules-based order — while also affecting individual states regardless of how democratic those states themselves may be.

These forms of abuse represent a serious challenge for the international community, but they also underline the urgent need for comprehensive action. International systems and mechanisms require thorough scrutiny, accompanied by political awareness, institutional reform and sustained efforts to restore trust. This is essential not only to prevent politically motivated persecution of individuals and hostile policies directed against entire communities or states, but also to rebuild confidence in the global system of international law and institutions.

Reform and restoring trust: Coordinated efforts to prevent abuse

There is an urgent need for coordinated efforts to reform and strengthen the frameworks of global institutions so that they cannot be exploited by authoritarian regimes. This includes strengthening oversight and accountability mechanisms in organizations such as Interpol, the United Nations and the OSCE. Greater transparency and stronger civic oversight of international mechanisms and institutions are also necessary.

The defence of international law, human rights and fundamental freedoms requires, among other things, joint pressure by civil society, international organizations and human-rights networks to ensure that global institutions are protected from capture or exploitation by states and powerful actors whose objectives run contrary to the principles of justice and human rights.

In democratic countries, governments and civil society must work together to strengthen national resilience against external pressure and manipulation. They should also commit themselves to strengthening organizations and individuals operating under authoritarian rule, supporting research and monitoring into abuses of international mechanisms, and building international pressure to end malicious practices.

This requires stronger legal frameworks, greater public awareness of the threats posed by such abuses and sustained international diplomacy in support of global reform efforts. National strategies should be aligned with international initiatives in order to create stronger defences against the erosion of justice and the rule of law — ensuring that no state becomes either a victim of, or an enabler of, authoritarian tactics.

The road towards restoring international justice and order is undoubtedly difficult and complex. But it is both necessary and unavoidable — and fundamental to the future stability and credibility of an international order based on the rule of law.

By confronting these challenges at both the international and national levels, we can begin the necessary process of repairing and protecting global institutions and restoring confidence that they will remain instruments of justice rather than instruments of oppression.

This article was originally published in Macedonian by CIVIL Media in August 2024, in the context of the Blerim Ramadani case and the wider debate over the use and potential abuse of Interpol mechanisms in politically sensitive cases. The English translation was published in September 2026, as similar cases once again brought these questions to the forefront.

The article is the result of extensive research, drawing on direct briefings, more than 20 official online sources and numerous media references. The information presented is based on official and credible sources containing extensive and detailed reporting on different aspects of the subject, with the aim of providing an accurate and comprehensive analysis. The text is presented in its original 2024 context. Any errors of interpretation are unintentional, and feedback that may contribute to further clarification or correction is welcome.

Related reading: In September 2026, the detention of former KLA member Fadil Pushkolli in North Macedonia, following a Serbian request circulated through INTERPOL, once again brought into focus the questions examined in this analysis. Read CIVIL Media’s report: “The Pushkolli case reopens the question of Serbian warrants: INTERPOL, Kosovo and the risk of political abuse.”

Sources and further reading

Aliu, Leonora. “Appeals Underway for Kosovars on Interpol List.” Kosovo 2.0, February 9, 2017. Kosovo 2.0

Chope, Christopher. Transnational Repression as a Growing Threat to the Rule of Law and Human Rights. Report, Doc. 15787. Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, June 5, 2023. PACE

Davies, Rhys. “Political Persecution: Exploiting Interpol’s Database and Blue Notices for Authoritarian Agendas.” Red Notice Monitor, February 28, 2024. Red Notice Monitor

Fair Trials. Dismantling the Tools of Oppression: Ending the Misuse of INTERPOL. October 4, 2018. Fair Trials

Fair Trials. “INTERPOL: New Data Reveals 1,000 Red Notices and Wanted Person Diffusions Rejected or Deleted Each Year.” November 7, 2022. Fair Trials

Freedom House. “Russia: Transnational Repression Origin Country Case Study.” Understanding Transnational Repression, 2021. Freedom House Russia

Freedom House. “TNR Watch: Interpol on Notice.” July 11, 2024. Freedom House TNR Watch

INTERPOL. “About Notices.” n.d. INTERPOL: About Notices

INTERPOL. “About Red Notices.” n.d. INTERPOL: Red Notices

INTERPOL. “Americas: Hundreds of Human Trafficking Victims Rescued.” April 30, 2018. INTERPOL: Operation Libertad

INTERPOL. “Cash, Guns, Cocaine and a Suspected Terrorist Captured in International Border Operation.” October 26, 2021. INTERPOL: Operation Neptune III

INTERPOL. “Commission for the Control of INTERPOL’s Files (CCF).” n.d. INTERPOL: CCF

INTERPOL. “Compliance and Review.” n.d. INTERPOL: Compliance and review

INTERPOL. Constitution of the ICPO-INTERPOL and Rules on the Processing of Data. INTERPOL Legal Documents. n.d. INTERPOL legal documents

INTERPOL. “INTERPOL Statement Concerning Arrest Warrant for Agim Ceku.” March 28, 2006. INTERPOL statement on Agim Ceku

INTERPOL. “Serbia.” Member Countries. n.d. INTERPOL: Serbia

Lemon, Edward. “Weaponizing Interpol.” Journal of Democracy 30, no. 2 (April 2019): 15–29. Journal of Democracy article

Meacham, Sam. “Weaponizing the Police: Interpol as a Tool of Authoritarianism.” Harvard International Review, April 11, 2022. Harvard International Review

Michaelson, Ruth. “‘Illegal’ Extradition of Bahraini Dissident from Serbia Calls Interpol’s Role into Question.” The Guardian, February 16, 2022. The Guardian

Reuters. “Kosovo Former PM Arrested in France on Serbian Warrant.” The Guardian, January 5, 2017. The Guardian

Schenkkan, Nate, and Isabel Linzer. Out of Sight, Not Out of Reach: The Global Scale and Scope of Transnational Repression. Washington, DC: Freedom House, February 2021. Freedom House

Tsikhanouskaya, Sviatlana. “Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya’s Statement on Andrei Hniot’s Transfer to House Arrest in Serbia.” June 6, 2024. Statement on Andrei Hniot

Wicker, Roger. “Authoritarian Abuse of INTERPOL.” U.S. Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, November 17, 2021. U.S. Helsinki Commission

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