By Oleksandar Levchenko
Despite international sanctions and Western efforts to restrict Russian oil exports, 11 tankers carrying Russian oil passed through the English Channel on 19–20 September en route to Asian markets. According to AIS data, their combined cargo capacity amounted to approximately 10 million barrels, with the value of the cargo at current market prices estimated at around $1 billion. The episode demonstrates Russia’s ability to adapt its oil-export logistics to intensifying sanctions pressure.
Following the detention of the Smyrtos tanker by the United Kingdom, Russian oil companies and operators modified their transportation arrangements. Some vessels linked to the “shadow fleet” began to be reflagged under the Russian flag, while a significant share of exports continues to be carried by tankers that are not formally subject to sanctions. Their owners and operators include companies from Russia, China, Greece, and Cyprus.
According to the available data, from mid-2025 to spring 2026, the Russian Maritime Register registered more than 40 large tankers, while the share of oil transported under the Russian flag increased from approximately 3% to 23%. This points to a systematic adaptation of Russia’s maritime logistics to the sanctions regime rather than isolated attempts to circumvent restrictions.
The September passage through the English Channel is particularly illustrative. Of the 11 tankers carrying approximately 10 million barrels of oil, two were reportedly previously sanctioned vessels that had been reflagged under the Russian flag. Two others were owned by companies from Russia and China, while the remaining seven belonged to shipowners from EU countries.
At the same time, vessels operating under foreign flags and facing a higher risk of detention or inspection may use alternative routes through the North Sea and Atlantic. The combination of reflagging and route diversification has therefore become an important element of Russia’s strategy to maintain its oil exports.
Reflagging vessels under the Russian flag creates additional legal and political constraints for states seeking to intercept them. Under international maritime law, vessels on the high seas generally fall under the jurisdiction of their flag state, subject to exceptions established by international law. Consequently, the forcible detention of a Russian-flagged vessel without an appropriate legal basis carries significantly greater risks of international confrontation than operations against vessels lacking proper registration or having an uncertain legal status.
This legal feature can serve Moscow as an additional instrument for protecting its oil-export logistics. Reflagging a vessel under a national flag does not make it immune from enforcement measures, but it raises the political and legal costs of any attempt to forcibly detain it.
Russia is therefore gradually adapting its “shadow fleet” to the evolving sanctions environment. Whereas earlier efforts relied primarily on complex corporate structures, offshore registration, and opaque insurance arrangements, the use of Russian state jurisdiction is now becoming another element of the strategy to protect vessels involved in the oil trade.
This has direct implications for the effectiveness of sanctions against Russia’s oil sector. If large volumes of Russian oil continue to move through European maritime routes to Asian buyers with limited disruption, the sanctions regime loses part of its intended deterrent effect. According to estimates cited in relevant analytical materials, these oil-export mechanisms could generate up to $40.3 billion in revenues for the Russian budget during the second half of 2026.
The involvement of European shipowners presents a separate challenge. If seven of the 11 tankers that passed through the English Channel over a single weekend were indeed owned by EU-based companies, this illustrates the difficulty of enforcing sanctions even within European jurisdictions. In this case, the problem is not limited to Russia’s mechanisms for circumventing restrictions; it also concerns the ability of European regulators to monitor the activities of their own companies, operators, insurers, and intermediaries.
For the EU and G7, this means that enforcement needs to focus not only on the final destination of Russian oil but also on the entire logistics chain involved in its transportation. This includes scrutiny of vessel ownership structures, registration, insurance, chartering arrangements, transshipment, and the origin of the cargo.
Particular attention should be paid to European shipowners and intermediaries that continue to handle Russian oil within or at the margins of the sanctions regime. Potential measures include tighter controls over chartering, the withdrawal of licences from systematic violators, sanctions against intermediaries, and enhanced monitoring of insurance and financial transactions associated with the transportation of Russian oil.
The passage of 11 tankers through the English Channel does not mean that the sanctions regime has collapsed, but it does demonstrate its structural vulnerabilities. Russia continues to adapt its oil-export logistics faster than the enforcement system is evolving. The key challenge for the EU and G7 is therefore not only to introduce additional restrictions, but to ensure their effective enforcement throughout the entire chain — from the shipowner and insurer to the final purchaser of the oil.
Oleksandr Levchenko is a Ukrainian diplomat, independent analyst and professor at the State Tax University in Ukraine. He served as Ukraine’s ambassador to Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina (2010–2017) and as a consul in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (1993–1997). During the war, he has written some 5,000 articles on Russia’s aggression against Ukraine for online media outlets in nine countries.
Written for CIVIL Today.