By Dragan Mishev

In cooperation with the CIVIL Hybrid Threats Monitoring Team (CHTM)

Translated by: N. Cvetkovska

According to the analysis of the CIVIL Hybrid Threats Monitoring Team (CHTM), increased Russian influence on the 2025 local elections is noticeable, both in the pre-election activities and during the elections themselves, which moves through three channels: directly through the participation of pro-Russian parties in the election race, non-transparent financing of political parties participating in the elections by oligarchs who have close ties to Russia through established business relations, and indirectly through Russian propaganda narratives that are being placed in some Macedonian media outlets.

Direct influence through the participation of pro-Russian parties in the elections

Direct Russian influence is noticeable through the participation of openly pro-Russian parties in the local elections, with candidates for mayors and municipal council members.

A typical example is the participation in the elections of the Levica party, with a consistent anti-NATO and Eurosceptic orientation. The CIVIL Hybrid Threats Monitoring Team (CHTM) has archived several critical analyses about the “shadow of Moscow” in the views and actions of Levica, especially after the full-scale Russian aggression against Ukraine in 2022. Amid the Russian aggression, Levica received Russian Ambassador Sergey Bazdnikin in the Macedonian Parliament, where, as they boasted, they talked for 90 minutes without a translator in Macedonian about “denazification,” the favorite Russian narrative used to justify the aggression against Ukraine. Previously, Levica not only didn’t give its parliamentary votes for the adoption of the Declaration condemning the military attacks in Parliament on March 3, but it also strongly opposed it. Amidst the Russian aggression against Ukraine, members of Levica visited Moscow, where they met with the leader of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (KPRF), Gennady Zyuganov, as well as with the leadership of the party and some MPs of the Russian Duma.

This year, the leader of Levica and member of parliament, Dimitar Apasiev, “boasted” on social media that he had landed in Moscow, Russia, on the occasion of celebrating the 80th anniversary of Victory Over Fascism Day.

As for the regular laying of flowers by the party delegation at the monument commemorating the victory over fascism on May 9, organized by the Embassy of the Russian Federation, it is pointless to repeat ourselves. With the participation of Levica in the elections, and the council seats won, Russia has a direct influence on the work of the municipal councils.

Although marginalized, Janko Bacev’s pro-Russian party “United Macedonia”, ran in the local elections with 29 candidate lists under the slogan: “Let’s take back our country.” Similar themes and narratives such as “let’s take back our country” were present prior to the elections in Moldova, where pro-Russian parties like the Patriotic Bloc use the rhetoric about “restoring sovereignty” and “restoring peace,” with an emphasis on ending Western influence and restoring close relations with Russia.

Additionally, the party supported the candidate for mayor of Skopje, Zoran Jovanovski, who in these local elections will run as an independent candidate, known for his advocacy for closer relations with Russia and China, who in his program promises “strengthening ties with brotherly Russia” if he becomes mayor of Skopje, bringing at least 15 investors from Russia and three from Belarus, as well as an initiative for economic cooperation with these countries.

No less significant for the penetration of Russian influence in the elections is the participation of Deputy Prime Minister, Minister for Inter-Community Relations, Ivan Stoiljković in them, who as President of the Democratic Party of Serbs in Macedonia, acted as the bearer of the “Brotherhood List” in Kumanovo. Stoiljković has openly pro-Russian/ pro-Serbian positions, has participated in a Security Forum in Russia, where Russian President Vladimir Putin also addressed the event, in the company of the Director of the Serbian Security Information Agency, Aleksandar Vulin, as well as the convicted former President of Republika Srpska, Milorad Dodik. Stoiljković is otherwise also known as a regular guest at receptions and events organized by the Embassy of the Russian Federation in Skopje, as well as for his participation in the manifestation of the “Serbian World” in North Macedonia, when high-ranking Serbian officials walked around the country, accompanied by regular police and Serbian army uniforms, representatives of Serbian martial associations in paramilitary uniforms and fiddlers, whereas at Kajmakcalan, carrying Serbian, Montenegrin, and Greek flags, they proclaimed the “Serbian Resurrection”, and Kajmakcalan the “gate of Serbia”.

Influence through financing of parties by pro-Russian oligarchs

Even though public reports do not prove in detail the financial connections between specific Macedonian parties and oligarchs and companies with pro-Russian interests, there are serious warnings, while CIVIL has already alerted that “the system of financing parties in North Macedonia formally requires transparency, but the practice shows “a lot of money, little music”.

Weaknesses in the control of donations, the relatively easy formation of candidate lists, and the flexibility of local election funds, create a risk of influence through the economic interests of these oligarchs connected to Russia. This could happen through: donations through legal entities connected to Russian or pro-Russian business interests, using local oligarchs and companies with economic ties to the “Russian world,” or providing resources for a campaign with an anti-Western label.

On top of this are the systemic weaknesses in the transparency of campaign financing, which should alert the public about the legitimacy of the electoral process, but it seems as if everything goes unnoticed. The shortcomings are not just technical failures, but create grounds for suspicion about the influence of non-transparent sources of financing on the electoral competition.

Additionally, the Macedonian-Russian Chamber of Commerce operates in North Macedonia, as a “bridge for economic connection between the Republic of Macedonia and the Russian Federation,” where well-known Macedonian oligarchs and companies are members, who pursue their business interests with the Russian Federation at a time of military aggression by that same Federation against another sovereign state, and while Russia is under sanctions from the EU and NATO, which are constantly expanding.

Russian propaganda narratives in Macedonian media outlets during the elections

As CIVIL Media previously reported, based on the insights from the CIVIL Hybrid Threats Monitoring Team (CHTM), there has been a noticeable increase in the presence of content featuring Russian propaganda narratives ahead of the local elections. According to CHTM’s findings, some Macedonian media outlets have made efforts to take leading positions in the region as well, when it comes to spreading Russian propaganda narratives.

The increased Russian propaganda in some Macedonian media outlets during the campaign for the local elections has multiple purposes, which are in correlation with the Kremlin’s broader strategy for influence in Europe, the Balkans, and including North Macedonia.

Russian propaganda, through convenient media outlets in North Macedonia, which is a NATO member and candidate for EU membership, seeks to portray the Alliance and the EU as hypocritical, corrupt, and hostile, which should weaken the credibility of these institutions among citizens, which corresponds to the statements of the party leadership which, following the confrontation with European institutions on the Belgrade-Budapest relation, accuses the EU of an alleged attack on Macedonian identity, while, on the other hand, wants to present Russia and Putin as allies in the fight to defend “Macedonianism,” which will deter citizens from voting for pro-European options.

The goal of the increased presence of Russian propaganda narratives is to create an environment of distrust, instability, backsliding of democratic processes, and slowing down of the Euro-Atlantic integration, which in the long run would leave North Macedonia susceptible to Russian influence and vulnerable to future geopolitical games.

This article is part of the Democracy Navigator project – a strategic response to disinformation and hybrid threats, building democratic resilience.