Serbia and Russia are not just influencing North Macedonia—they’re reshaping it. Through propaganda, cultural domination, and ideological infiltration, a hybrid war is being waged without a single shot fired.
By Jabir Deralla
Abstract
North Macedonia is under siege – not by armies, but by narratives. The country faces a coordinated hybrid assault from Serbia and Russia, designed to erode democratic institutions, undermine Euro-Atlantic integration, and reshape national identity through cultural, political, and psychological means. This article draws on on-the-ground reporting, personal experience, and exclusive expert insights, as well as testimony from both public figures and anonymous insider sources in the fields of intelligence, politics, and civil society. It exposes how foreign propaganda, clerical influence, and media manipulation work in concert to normalize authoritarianism and discredit democratic resistance. Unless urgent countermeasures are taken, North Macedonia may become the next casualty in a regional authoritarian surge – one with profound consequences for the democratic future of Europe’s southeast.
Kids in North Macedonia, born more than two decades after the country’s independence from the Yugoslav federation, may not be fluent in Serbian. Many would even struggle to understand some Serbian words or linguistic constructions. Yet, too many of them sing Serbian turbo folk songs by heart. In coffee bars and restaurants, at weddings and family gatherings, Serbian turbo folk rules the hearts and is a must for the repertoire of DJs or bands. It dominates the airwaves on radio and television. In buses, shops, and taxis – Serbian turbo folk is unavoidable.
So what? There were times when English and U.S. bands dominated the radio waves. Well, there’s a “slight” difference. Turbo folk music emerged during the Yugoslav Wars of the 1990s, often used as a tool of propaganda to stir nationalist fervor, spread ethnic and religious hatred, and glorify war criminals. It is inseparable from the political culture of that era. Understanding this sonic landscape is essential to understanding the depth of cultural domination – and the long arc of influence operations that are still shaping the region.
What begins as entertainment can become alignment. Culture, when deliberately shaped, becomes more than identity – it becomes strategy. Music, media, rituals, and even humor are the vessels through which influence travels undetected, embedding foreign values into everyday life. These are not accidental trends; they are carefully sustained atmospheres that soften societies for deeper political penetration.
No one wants to see what is really happening – until it happens. And not even then. This is not just a psychological defense mechanism; it is a pattern embedded in our social fabric – in public life, politics, and diplomacy alike.
Influence operations thrive in this blind spot. Their very success depends on remaining hidden – or at least deniable. That is the nature of intelligence work and strategic propaganda: to shape outcomes without appearing as the source. The most effective manipulation is not the one imposed from above, but the one that quietly convinces people that the thoughts they hold were always their own.
When foreign narratives become internal convictions, when outside agendas are disguised as national instincts, then influence has done its job. And by the time anyone notices, the damage has already taken root – in policies, identities, and allegiances.
The long memory of manipulation
Influence operations do not arise spontaneously – they are engineered through a century-long legacy of authoritarian experimentation. From the earliest days of the Soviet Union, Lenin recognized that shaping perception was just as crucial as seizing territory. Under Stalin, influence became a dark science, perfected through the secret police and ideological enforcement mechanisms led by men like Lavrentiy Beria, Stalin’s feared intelligence chief. Beria, notorious for his ruthlessness, turned the Soviet security apparatus into an omnipresent machine for control, manipulating not just political opponents, but entire populations through fear, coercion, and psychological disintegration.
After Stalin, the Soviet KGB institutionalized these tactics on a global scale. Under the leadership of men like Yuri Andropov, the KGB elevated active measures – активные мероприятия – to a sophisticated doctrine. These included forgeries, front organizations, media manipulation, assassination, and the long-term infiltration of Western institutions. Their goal was not always to convince, but to confuse, divide, and demoralize. The Cold War may have ended, but the infrastructure and expertise of the KGB endured, metastasizing into today’s Russian intelligence services, notably the FSB and GRU.
In the post-Soviet era, this legacy fused with new technologies. Data-driven operations like Cambridge Analytica, influence networks like RT and Sputnik, and conspiracy ecosystems such as QAnon represent an evolution of these tactics. While not all are controlled by Moscow, many operate within its strategic orbit. QAnon, for instance, may be a largely homegrown American phenomenon, but it aligns perfectly with Russian objectives: destabilizing institutions, undermining democratic cohesion, and seeding paranoia in the public sphere. This is the new face of influence – decentralized, deniable, and dangerously effective.
The mind is the battlefield
Influence operations are successful not when they convince people of foreign ideas, but when they make those ideas feel like their own. The most effective propaganda does not announce itself – it mimics, adapts, and blends into local grievances, emotions, and identities. By exploiting social divisions, fears, and historical trauma, these operations rewire perception and reshape behavior. Over time, individuals begin to echo propaganda not as outsiders, but as believers. What begins as manipulation becomes conviction – and from there, political reality.
Modern influence operations do not merely aim to persuade. They aim to reshape how people think, feel, and act. Drawing from decades of psychological research and behavioral science, authoritarian regimes have weaponized techniques originally developed for advertising, propaganda, and even therapy. These operations exploit cognitive biases, emotional vulnerabilities, and group identities to implant ideas that feel personal, even when they originate from external sources.
The most effective disinformation doesn’t look foreign. It masquerades as a shared grievance, a justified fear, or a patriotic truth. When populations begin to echo these narratives as if they were their own, the operation has succeeded. This is not just persuasion – it is conditioning. And it is among the most dangerous tools in the modern arsenal of hybrid warfare.
The Serbian-Russian nexus in North Macedonia and the warning from the European Parliament
Serbian influence in North Macedonia does not operate in a vacuum. It is deeply interwoven with Russia’s broader strategy of destabilizing the Western Balkans and obstructing Euro-Atlantic integration. While Belgrade often plays the role of regional neighbor and cultural ally, it increasingly acts as a proxy conduit for Kremlin interests – amplifying narratives, supporting political actors, and enabling hybrid tactics that serve Moscow’s geopolitical goals.
This Serbian–Russian connection strikes at the most fragile pillars of North Macedonia’s democracy: media freedom, interethnic harmony, and public trust in democratic institutions and values. What appears to be traditional diplomacy or shared heritage is, in fact, a coordinated strategy of influence, refined through years of subversive activity and regional manipulation. It is in this context that official assessments, such as the European Parliament’s AFET report, must be read, not as isolated analysis, but as recognition of a growing threat to European security playing out on the Macedonian front.
The European Parliament’s Committee on Foreign Affairs (AFET) has raised serious concerns about the growing influence of the so-called “Serbian World” in North Macedonia. In a recent draft report, AFET warns that the country is increasingly subjected to hostile foreign influence, particularly through Serbian-language media, which serve as conduits for Kremlin-aligned narratives and disinformation. These media platforms, by creating an alternative information space, are eroding trust in democratic institutions and undermining North Macedonia’s path toward EU and NATO integration.
More broadly, the report highlights the existence of “Serbian World” structures that extend beyond cultural affinity into political, economic, and security domains. These include cross-border networks, opaque investment channels, and even historical affiliations rooted in the still-undeclared archives of Yugoslav-era secret services – UDBA and KOS. AFET recommends the urgent opening of these archives, both in North Macedonia and Serbia, as a step toward institutional transparency and democratic resilience.
The “Serbian World” agenda, according to the report, mirrors the logic of Russia’s “Russian World,” promoting pan-Serbian identity and cross-border loyalty as tools of geopolitical leverage. This influence is not limited to soft power. It is part of a broader pattern of authoritarian interference also seen in the Kremlin’s and Beijing’s regional tactics – combining economic coercion, narrative manipulation, and political infiltration.
AFET’s message is clear: without confronting these entangled threats, North Macedonia’s democratic future – and the stability of the Western Balkans – remain deeply vulnerable.
Covert operations
The influence of Serbia and Russia in North Macedonia does not merely operate through overt diplomacy, media, or religious institutions. Beneath the surface lies a deeper, more coordinated machinery, one driven by intelligence services, covert networks, and hybrid tactics meticulously crafted to shape political outcomes from the shadows.
A 2017 investigation by the Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project (OCCRP) revealed leaked counterintelligence documents from North Macedonia that exposed a strategic cooperation between Russian and Serbian operatives. Their aim: to derail the country’s NATO accession and stall its broader Western integration.
At the center of these operations was Goran Živaljević, a known agent of Serbia’s BIA (Security Intelligence Agency), who frequently traveled to Skopje to arrange influence operations. He facilitated meetings between Serbian-aligned actors, including prominent military commentator and later Serbian ambassador to Russia, Miroslav Lazanski, and key figures in North Macedonia’s political scene. Živaljević even resided in an apartment reportedly owned by one of the country’s most influential media figures, Branko Geroski, then editor-in-chief of major dailies, now the owner of Plusinfo.mk and member of a media ethics body. The network of proximity and plausible deniability gave these operations a veneer of legitimacy while embedding them deep within societal structures. One notable example is Goran Živaljević, a Serbian operative who was reportedly present inside North Macedonia’s Parliament during the violent events of April 27, 2017 – widely seen as an attempted coup. His presence during those critical hours raised serious concerns about direct involvement in destabilization efforts.
One key enabler in these operations was MP Ivan Stoiljković, an openly pro-Russian, ultra-nationalist figure known for promoting Belgrade’s and Moscow’s agendas. He played a critical role in facilitating contacts and narratives aimed at undermining North Macedonia’s Euro-Atlantic trajectory. Today, Stoiljković is no longer on the fringes. He serves as Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Inter-Community Relations and Political System in the government led by Prime Minister Hristijan Mickoski.
His appointment signals not only tolerance but open alignment with his ideological stance. Rather than facing scrutiny or investigation for his role in pro-Serbian and pro-Russian influence operations, Stoiljković has been elevated to one of the highest offices in government. In May 2025, he was even seen proudly attending Vladimir Putin’s military parade in Moscow – a symbolic gesture that underscores how little the current administration seeks to conceal its orientation.
Russian diplomats and intelligence agents also played a direct role. Their methods included targeted propaganda campaigns, disinformation warfare, and influence operations aimed at undermining public support for NATO, especially during the critical 2018 name-change referendum. CIVIL – Center for Freedom was among the few watchdogs that closely monitored and reported on these manipulations, documenting how false narratives were seeded to exacerbate ethnic divisions and discredit the country’s pro-Western commitments.
Yet, what makes these efforts even more dangerous is how Serbia functions as a regional proxy for Russian operations. Unnamed sources in the defense counterintelligence claim that intelligence coordination between Belgrade and Moscow is intensive and longstanding, and that includes joint hybrid operations, shared propaganda channels, and even paramilitary affiliations, some with links to North Macedonia’s extremist circles.
A 2024 Politico investigation revealed that a Serbian national, identified as Novica Antić, acted as an “agent of influence” for Russia’s FSB by meeting with European Parliament members and attempting to propagate Kremlin-aligned talking points, highlighting the broad scope of these operations. While the case remains both contested and politically charged, viewed by many as part of President Vučić’s broader strategy to curtail independent labor and civic activism, this case remains an example of how vulnerable are the Balkan countries to Russian intrusion and to manipulations around these issues.
The pattern in the local context is even clearer – and these operations often run unchallenged. Intelligence services do not act alone. They rely on sympathetic politicians, media operatives, and diaspora networks to repackage foreign agendas as local grievances. These tools are then used to deepen polarization, cultivate loyalty to autocratic alternatives, and erode democratic consensus.
Implications for North Macedonia’s democracy and defense
This bond of Russian-Serbian intelligence cooperation represents more than an abstract threat. It directly targets the sovereignty of North Macedonia. By weaponizing trust, identity, and media, these operations erode the very foundations of democratic resilience.
According to the recommendations of the European Parliament’s AFET Committee, as well as numerous national and international think-tanks, including CIVIL in North Macedonia, the country must confront this growing threat with urgency and resolve. This means strengthening counterintelligence capabilities in close coordination with NATO allies, ensuring transparency in political financing and media ownership, and accelerating the declassification of UDBA and KOS archives. In parallel, public education on hybrid threats and robust support for investigative journalism must be treated as national security priorities, not afterthoughts.
As Professor of Defense Studies at the Military Academy and a long-time VMRO-DPMNE veteran, Oliver Andonov offers a rare but critical internal perspective. Despite his party affiliation, he has emerged as a vocal critic of the current leadership, warning against the normalization of foreign influence. “We are not just facing ideological infiltration; we are witnessing an ongoing operation to undermine national sovereignty from within,” Andonov stated in conversation. He emphasizes that ignoring or politicizing the threat only deepens the country’s vulnerability. A strong supporter of Ukraine, he argues that North Macedonia must adopt a similarly resolute stance: “Defending democracy is not optional – it is existential.”
In today’s landscape, defense is no longer defined solely by tanks, troops, or arsenals. It is equally about a society’s ability to detect, understand, and respond to threats that arrive not with gunfire, but with distortion, division, and deception. A country may possess the most sophisticated weaponry and cutting-edge infrastructure – but if its “mindware” is compromised, if its public consciousness is infected with ideological malware, then it is defenseless long before a single shot is fired. In this sense, North Macedonia is perilously exposed. After years of ideological pressure, political indoctrination, and systemic disinformation, the country risks internalizing foreign agendas as if they were its own. That is the ultimate danger – to be conquered not by force, but by narrative.
The public – and society at large – must recognize that this is not a distant clash of spies and shadows. It is an active and ongoing assault on North Macedonia’s democratic foundations. And the antidote is not just vigilance – it is truth, transparency, and an unflinching political will.
The Serbian playbook of influence in North Macedonia
When it comes to Serbia’s influence, it is not simply a cultural legacy, but a deliberate strategy. The “cultural” dimension of Serbia’s hegemony is a perfect and “natural” enabler, a wide open avenue of unabated and continuous operation of influence and changing of people’s behavior. Simply put, political elites in North Macedonia are so dependent on Serbia’s political leadership that they rarely make a move without either seeking Belgrade’s approval – or fearing its wrath.
In many ways, North Macedonia – a longstanding “little brother” of Serbia – represents a critical frontline in the struggle between democracy and authoritarianism in the Balkans. Regardless of political and diplomatic maneuvers, the lines between Belgrade and Moscow are blurred, particularly when it comes to fulfilling the Serbian strategy of domination.
We need to be clear – once and for all. And we must repeat it as many times as necessary. This is not merely a story of shared language, or of pop and turbo folk culture. It is a story of state-sponsored narratives, political complicity, covert manipulation, and strategic disinformation. Serbia, under President Aleksandar Vučić, functions as an extension of the Kremlin’s regional ambitions, aligning itself with the concept of the “Serbian World” (Српски свет) – a Balkan replica of Putin’s “Russian World” (Русский мир).
Understanding how Serbian – and Russian – influence works, its tools, proxies, and narratives, is no longer optional. It is key to preserving the region’s stability and the soul of democracy itself. Ignoring it, or downplaying its consequences, carries grave risks — not just for North Macedonia, but for the broader European project.
It is utterly naïve to think that Belgrade’s growing dominance in Skopje is incidental or grounded in shared language, turbo-folk culture, or a fading Yugo-nostalgia. A long line of political generations in Serbia – including Milošević and his ideological heir Vučić – have pursued a systematic effort to instill illiberal values, obstruct EU integration, and disrupt multiethnic relations in North Macedonia.
From political blackmail and clerical interference to media propaganda and regional intimidation, Serbia plays a central role in what has long been – and is increasingly – a joint venture with Moscow.
The hidden vectors of power
Religion, particularly through the Serbian Orthodox Church (SOC), plays a central role in Belgrade’s soft power and cultural-political influence in North Macedonia. According to political analyst Ljubomir Kostovski, this influence is neither recent nor marginal – it is deep-rooted, steeped in history, and continuously weaponized in service of both Serbian and Russian strategic ambitions.
Kostovski explains that the SOC has historically denied core aspects of Macedonian identity and autonomy, often viewing the Macedonian Orthodox Church (MOC) as a subordinate or even illegitimate entity. This denial played a significant role in suppressing the development of a distinct Macedonian ecclesiastical identity, especially during the decades when recognition of the MOC was withheld.
The SOC’s long-standing refusal to recognize the MOC was not merely a theological stance – it was a political one. Kostovski notes that this denial served Serbia’s national interests by undermining Macedonian sovereignty and reinforcing a hegemonic narrative that framed Macedonian identity as an extension of Serbian heritage. Only recently has the SOC shifted its stance to officially recognize the MOC, a move Kostovski interprets not as a principled change, but a pragmatic adjustment driven by regional tensions, diplomatic pressure, and Serbia’s strategic recalibration in the Balkans.
Even now, with formal recognition granted, the SOC maintains significant cultural and political influence in North Macedonia. Its discourse continues to echo the ideology of the “Serbian World,” blending historical revisionism with religious symbolism to sustain the myth of a shared spiritual and civilizational space. This is not merely clerical soft power – it is a form of ideological conditioning.
Perhaps most telling is the MOC’s decision to distance itself from the Ecumenical Patriarchate in Constantinople – the very institution that first recognized its autocephaly – and to instead embrace closer ties with the SOC. This decision coincided with the MOC’s silence on the recognition of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, even as Ukraine faced brutal Russian aggression. Kostovski calls this a “paradox,” one that reveals the deeper loyalties of the Macedonian Church leadership, whose alignment with the SOC may inadvertently – or deliberately – reflect Moscow’s geopolitical preferences.
In Kostovski’s words, “this Church, this composition, never really detached itself.” The historical subordination to Belgrade appears to persist beneath the surface of formal independence, creating what he calls “a lasting relationship of subordination.”
Through symbolic rituals, ecclesiastical hierarchy, and cultural institutions, the SOC continues to embed its influence in North Macedonia. More substantively, it acts as both a driver and a political instrument of Serbia’s broader regional strategy – and by extension, Russia’s – working to maintain psychological and cultural control over core narratives of identity, belonging, and loyalty. And when strategically beneficial, it readily adopts the rhetoric of victimhood – casting itself as a sacred bulwark against the “evil forces” of the West.
The struggle for spiritual autonomy in North Macedonia is far from over. Behind the garments and candles lies a sophisticated apparatus of influence – one that transcends theology and strikes at the heart of sovereignty and democratic resilience.
Political influence and ideological conditioning
The 2024 elections in North Macedonia marked a dramatic shift in political power – a shift that cannot be understood without addressing the influence of Serbian-backed narratives and Russian-style disinformation. The overwhelming victory of VMRO-DPMNE and its presidential candidate, supported by a range of ultranationalist actors – and, according to anonymous sources, backed by Serbian and Hungarian financial and strategic support – was not simply a domestic political story. It was the culmination of years of ideological conditioning shaped by foreign malign influence from the authoritarian axis operating under the Kremlin’s far-reaching shadow.
Serbian and Russian propaganda played a decisive role in creating a climate of distrust toward Western institutions, portraying the EU as hypocritical and hostile to Macedonian identity. One of the dominant election slogans claimed the country needed to be “brought back to the people,” a thinly veiled message advocating the restoration of ethnic Macedonian dominance and the marginalization of minorities – particularly Albanians.
As political analyst and party leader Ivon Veličkovski explains, these narratives were not accidental. They were “designed to stoke fear, consolidate ethnic voting blocs, and portray the EU as an enemy of Macedonian sovereignty.” He argues that the campaign was infused with “coded messages and open resentment,” weaponizing identity politics to shift the electorate toward illiberal, anti-Western positions. According to Veličkovski, this strategy mirrored Serbian political discourse and Kremlin messaging, effectively aligning North Macedonia’s internal divisions with the broader goals of authoritarian influence in the region.
Another central theme was the vilification of the pro-European government led by the Social Democrats and, more pointedly, DUI. The narrative framed DUI and its Foreign Minister Bujar Osmani as traitors who had “sold out” Macedonian interests to Bulgaria by signing the EU negotiation framework in July 2022. Throughout 2024, the then-opposition VMRO-DPMNE and its leader Hristijan Mickoski, supported by a range of civil society figures, experts, and media outlets, repeatedly insisted that Russian influence in the country was nonexistent – claiming it was merely a narrative invented by DUI (i.e., the Albanians). Serbian influence was not mentioned at all.
Three years later, Prime Minister Mickoski reinforced this narrative, stating that Osmani had “nailed Macedonian lungs, hands and legs.” Such inflammatory language closely echoes Kremlin and Belgrade propaganda tactics – turning the EU into an external enemy, and framing Serbia as the true guardian of Macedonian identity.
This ideological conditioning is no accident. It is the result of a deliberate campaign to reshape public consciousness. Generational identity politics, historical grievances, conspiracy theories, and linguistic populism are all manipulated in ways that mirror Russian influence operations elsewhere. Serbia acts as both a hub and a transmission belt for these narratives, promoting Euroscepticism, polarization, and ultranationalist populism.
Furthermore, the rhetoric and appointments of the new governing coalition suggest that authoritarian learning is already underway. There are clear signs of democratic backsliding, efforts to control media narratives, and growing hostility toward civil society and independent journalism. The ideological space is narrowing – defined increasingly by ethno-nationalist orthodoxy and cultural exclusivism.
According to former President Stevo Pendarovski, Serbian influence in North Macedonia is deeply rooted and multilayered, extending far beyond formal diplomacy or bilateral relations. He describes it as a persistent and complex phenomenon that draws upon both cultural and ideological legacies – inherited mainly from living together in the former socialist Yugoslavia.
This influence manifests itself across levels of political, cultural, and economic life in North Macedonia, often operating subtly through shared language, religious institutions, and media narratives. Pendarovski emphasizes that Serbia functions not only as an actor in its own right, but increasingly as a proxy for Russian strategic interests in the region. In this sense, Belgrade serves as a conduit for Kremlin-aligned narratives and hybrid tactics, helping to undermine democratic processes, foster ethnic divisions, and obstruct North Macedonia’s Euro-Atlantic path.
This context makes it clear: the country’s political transformation is not an isolated national phenomenon, but part of a wider transnational campaign. North Macedonia’s internal political arena has become a frontline in a geopolitical struggle – and the stakes are no less than the future of liberal democracy in the Balkans.
Engineering consent and division
The Serbian and Russian influence campaigns in North Macedonia are amplified and normalized through a powerful and multilayered media ecosystem. This includes not only traditional pro-Serbian outlets and well-known public figures, but also a sprawling network of portals, influencers, and social media personalities who openly champion Serbian narratives as part of the cultural mainstream. Parallel to these visible actors operates a more concealed infrastructure: troll pages, bot-run accounts, anonymous meme channels, and Telegram or Viber groups with unclear authorship – all mimicking grassroots sentiment. Many clickbait-style “news” sites, lacking editorial transparency, further recycle and remix propaganda content. Together, these overt and covert elements create an information environment where foreign narratives are not only circulated, but internalized – overwhelming the public discourse and shaping perceptions with the illusion of authenticity and local consensus.
These propaganda and media channels push a familiar set of narratives: the West is portrayed as corrupt and morally bankrupt; the EU as a vehicle of foreign domination; the U.S. as a source of war, chaos, and manipulation; and Serbia as a stable, culturally aligned protector. These themes are not random. They are carefully engineered to exploit deep-seated grievances, whether historical, ethnic, religious, or socio-economic. The goal is to generate suspicion toward democratic reforms, to delegitimize diversity, and to discredit pro-European leadership.
Russian state media outlets such as Sputnik and RT do not operate directly in North Macedonia, but their content is widely disseminated through Serbian-language media hubs. These channels, accessible via cable television and local telecommunications providers, syndicate Kremlin-aligned narratives without context or critical framing. Their formula is potent: a mix of sensationalism, tabloid-style gossip, lowbrow entertainment, and conspiracy theories. This often includes kitschy content, explicit humor, and the hypersexualized portrayal of women – especially singers and TV hosts. Beneath the flashy packaging lies a strategic goal: to erode trust in democratic institutions, fuel ethnic resentment, and normalize authoritarian worldviews.
This hybrid information warfare systematically targets civil society actors, independent journalists, and public intellectuals – branding them as “foreign agents,” “traitors,” or “enemies of the people.” These labels – drawn straight from the authoritarian lexicons of Moscow and Belgrade – are not mere rhetoric; they are tools of repression. They fuel orchestrated smear campaigns, character assassination, and digital witch hunts. While fringe portals traffic in conspiracy and fabricated imagery, it is in mainstream media – often national broadcasters – where doctored stories, blatant falsehoods, and personal defamation are normalized. Former ambassadors, government officials, and prominent journalists routinely take part, giving these attacks an air of legitimacy. In some cases, the hate escalates into explicit threats of violence – even execution. The goal is unmistakable: to silence dissent, discredit truth-tellers, and enforce ideological loyalty through fear and humiliation.
In this environment, media ceases to be a check on power – it becomes its megaphone. The consequences are profound: deepening polarization, voter manipulation, and an electorate increasingly detached from facts, driven instead by emotion and identity politics. The playbook is familiar – because it is Serbian, so – it is “ours.” The media conduct dictated by Belgrade is now effectively copy-pasted onto North Macedonia’s airwaves, echoing the same narratives, tactics, and tone. In this landscape, Russian propaganda narratives flow smoothly and effortlessly, camouflaged by cultural familiarity, amplified by media convergence, and reinforced by years of ideological conditioning. The result is not just misinformation, but manufactured consent.
A disinformed public is not just obedient – it becomes easily controlled. Worse still, it becomes a complicit and even enthusiastic foot soldier in destructive political operations. Whether the aim is to entrench authoritarian rule in the Western Balkans or to justify and support brutal aggression against Ukraine, disinformation fuels allegiance to the aggressor. It turns victimhood into a weapon and deflects responsibility through manufactured narratives. In North Macedonia, disinformation has become a central tool – serving both domestic authoritarian consolidation and foreign interference. And it flows directly from the ideological arsenals of both the Russian and Serbian “Worlds.”
Montenegro, Republika Srpska, and the expansion of the “Serbian World”
North Macedonia is far from an isolated case. The playbook Belgrade applies in Skopje is part of a broader, regionally coordinated strategy, clearly visible in Serbia’s posture toward Montenegro and Republika Srpska in Bosnia and Herzegovina. While the tactics may differ, the objective remains constant: to expand Serbian influence under the ideological umbrella of the “Serbian World,” often with the tacit or explicit backing of the Kremlin. Successes and failures in one arena are used to recalibrate operations in others, revealing how adaptable and self-reinforcing these networks have become. This axis of authoritarian influence extends beyond Belgrade and Moscow, drawing in like-minded regimes in Budapest and Bratislava, and aligning with far-right structures across Europe and beyond.
In Montenegro, Serbian influence was most visibly exercised through the Serbian Orthodox Church, which played a pivotal role in mobilizing mass protests against the pro-Western government between 2019 and 2021. These church-led protests, dubbed “litije,” helped bring down the government of Milo Đukanović and ushered in a more Serbia-aligned leadership. The SOC’s role wasn’t spiritual – it was political, and it closely resembled the tactics being used in North Macedonia.
In Republika Srpska, the Serbian entity of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Belgrade maintains a de facto patron-client relationship with the secessionist leader Milorad Dodik. Dodik’s increasingly open calls for separation from Bosnia, alongside his visits to Moscow and admiration for Putin, illustrate just how deeply the “Serbian World” vision has aligned itself with the Russian one. This alignment also mirrors how Vučić balances formal pro-EU rhetoric with concrete anti-Western policies and partnerships.
These parallel cases make one thing clear: Serbia’s ambitions are not rooted in cultural outreach or good-neighborly relations. They are about geopolitical leverage. What connects Montenegro, Republika Srpska, and North Macedonia is not simply shared history or cultural affinity – it is the deliberate exploitation of those ties. Through religious sentiment, identity politics, and coordinated disinformation, Belgrade – and by extension, Moscow – seeks to weaken democratic institutions and derail Euro-Atlantic integration.
Viewed together, these cases expose a disturbing reality: North Macedonia is not only next in line – it may be the most strategically vulnerable domino in the construction of a Balkan axis aligned with the Kremlin. If left unchallenged, this axis won’t just alter political boundaries; it has the potential to reshape the ideological landscape of Southeastern Europe.
International implications and counterstrategies
The spread of the “Serbian World,” in coordination with the Kremlin’s “Russian World,” presents not just a regional concern but a challenge to European security and democratic coherence. The hybrid tactics employed – ranging from disinformation and soft power manipulation to overt political interference – are designed to erode trust in Euro-Atlantic institutions and fracture the social fabric of vulnerable states like North Macedonia.
This makes it imperative for international policymakers to treat Serbian influence not as a mere bilateral concern, but as part of a broader authoritarian network. The EU, NATO, and key democratic allies must acknowledge that strategic neglect of the Western Balkans creates dangerous openings – enabling authoritarian actors to erode democratic norms and threaten the very architecture of Europe’s stability.
In today’s world, the size or formal strength of a country no longer defines its capacity to disrupt. Asymmetric attacks – disinformation campaigns, narrative warfare, cyber infiltration, political manipulation – can be launched with minimal resources and yield disproportionate, even devastating, effects. A handful of operatives, a network of troll farms, or a well-placed media campaign can destabilize institutions, polarize societies, and derail reform processes. These attacks are not aimed at conquering land, but at occupying minds. And their cumulative effect can hollow out democracies from within – before anyone even notices the rot and disgraceful defeat.
Statements of support are not enough; what is needed are concrete policies, long-term commitments, and robust support for democratic institutions, independent media, and civil society actors.
North Macedonia, though small in size, holds outsized geopolitical significance – especially if its society is weaponized as a tool of hybrid warfare against the EU and NATO. Its trajectory will serve as a bellwether for the region. If democratic backsliding under foreign-influenced populist regimes is tolerated here, the same authoritarian playbook will be replicated elsewhere – with increasing speed and sophistication.
What can be done: A blueprint for democratic resilience?
Countering the “Serbian World” and “Russian World” influence networks requires far more than rhetorical condemnation or sporadic diplomatic gestures. What’s needed is a multi-layered, long-term strategy – one that addresses both the visible and invisible fronts of hybrid warfare.
First, strategic communication must be treated as a matter of national and international urgency. Disinformation must be systematically exposed – not merely by debunking falsehoods, but by replacing them with compelling, pro-democracy narratives that resonate with people’s identities, hopes, and frustrations. Silence creates space for manipulation; only clear, consistent communication can reclaim the public sphere.
Second, support for media and civil society is indispensable. Investigative journalism, fact-checking platforms, civic education initiatives, and grassroots watchdogs – driven by genuinely committed individuals and organizations – form the frontline of democratic defense. These actors must be protected and empowered, not only with funding, but with security protocols, international recognition, and long-term commitment.
Third, clerical diplomacy must not be overlooked. Religious institutions – so often instrumentalized by authoritarian regimes – should be engaged in principled dialogue and encouraged to align with democratic values, human dignity, and interfaith solidarity. The voice of faith must not be monopolized by reactionary forces. Above all, clerical structures must acknowledge and respect the secular character of the state – and act accordingly.
Fourth, targeted sanctions and diplomatic pressure must be directed at individuals, networks, and institutions – whether state or non-state – that enable or amplify foreign malign influence and hybrid operations. From propaganda outlets and political operatives to clerics and business proxies, this ecosystem of hybrid warfare must face tangible, strategic consequences.
And finally, the EU and NATO must stop treating enlargement as a purely bureaucratic process. The longer countries like North Macedonia remain in strategic limbo, the more vulnerable they become to corrosive influence. Accelerated, conditional, but credible integration pathways are essential – not only for aspirant countries but for the stability and security of Europe as a whole.
These recommendations align closely with the findings of the Defending Democracy and Human Rights Report and Policy Recommendations (2025), which outlines ten strategic pillars for countering hybrid threats, strengthening democratic institutions, and safeguarding Europe’s democratic integrity. As emphasized in that report, a whole-of-society approach is essential – merging policy, education, security, and international coordination.
This is not charity. It is strategic self-defense – against an authoritarian axis that grows bolder with every success, and more adaptable with every unchecked intrusion.
Ignoring the signs today will result in far greater costs tomorrow, not only for North Macedonia, but for Europe’s entire southeastern flank.
Political context: North Macedonia and Serbia in 2025
As of mid‑2025, both North Macedonia and Serbia are navigating complex political landscapes marked by mounting tensions, public disillusionment, and ambitious yet largely unfulfilled aspirations for European Union accession. North Macedonia joined NATO in 2020, while Serbia remains firmly anti‑NATO, with its leadership repeatedly affirming that membership is off the table.
North Macedonia: Between declarations and commitment to EU membership
Government structure
North Macedonia is a parliamentary republic. Following the May 2024 elections, a coalition government was formed, consisting of the center‑right VMRO‑DPMNE, the Albanian VLEN bloc, and the ZNAM movement. While the coalition publicly prioritizes economic development, anti‑corruption measures, and EU integration, it has pursued a populist, nationalist agenda—using the unresolved identity dispute with Bulgaria to stall its EU accession process. According to Freedom House, North Macedonia is classified as a partly free country.
Key political issues
North Macedonia’s political landscape is characterized by a stalled EU accession process, entrenched corruption, deep political and ethnic polarization, serious challenges in judicial and institutional reform, widespread youth disillusionment, and mounting environmental concerns. The country has made progress on EU membership, notably by addressing Bulgaria’s historical and cultural objections. The European Parliament has adopted its first progress report on North Macedonia in three years, urging continued reform and consensus-building. Nevertheless, judicial reforms under the 2024–2028 strategy are hindered by persistent interference from other branches of government, and corruption remains deeply rooted, with perceived political connections often determining success.
Serbia: Political turmoil and public protests
Government structure
Serbia, also a parliamentary republic, experienced significant political upheaval in April 2025, when medical professor Đuro Macut was appointed Prime Minister following mass anti‑corruption protests after the collapse of a bus station. Despite this leadership change, the ruling Serbian Progressive Party (SNS) retains its dominance, and President Aleksandar Vučić continues to exercise substantial power. Serbia serves as Russia’s principal proxy in the Balkans, wielding considerable influence in North Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Montenegro. According to Freedom House, it is also considered partly free.
Key political issues
Serbia is entrenched in a deep governance crisis, driven by corruption allegations, infrastructure failures, and youth-led protests. Under mounting pressure, the government is striving to maintain control while balancing international alliances and energy priorities. Massive protests erupted after a fatal bus station collapse, attributed to corrupt infrastructure projects, with students and civil society groups demanding judicial reform, media freedom, and fair elections. Although Serbia publicly expresses a desire to join the EU, its close ties to Russia and China—highlighted by President Vučić’s attendance at Russia’s Victory Day parade—have raised alarm in Brussels. EU officials continue to press Serbia to make a strategic choice between aligning with the EU or maintaining its Eastern alliances.
Publication Context
This article was originally requested by an international organization active in the Western Balkans. Following internal review and a change in oversight, the article was ultimately declined on the grounds that it was “too explosive” for publication. The author chose to publish it independently in the public interest.
The analysis is based on research and interviews conducted in June and July 2025. While political developments have continued—especially in Serbia—the core narratives and power structures addressed in this article remain intact. For this reason, it is presented in its original form, without post-submission edits.
Author’s Note
This analysis is the result of years of research and professional engagement with sources across political, diplomatic, and intelligence domains—many of whom requested anonymity due to the sensitivity of the subject matter. It is also shaped by personal experience under the authoritarian structures of former Yugoslavia, where advocating for democracy and human rights often came at personal cost. These experiences, together with continuous investigation into evolving influence operations in the region, form the foundation of this work.
Further Reading & References
- Defending Democracy and Human Rights: Report and Policy Recommendations (2025)
https://defendingdemocracy.global/storage/2025/04/Defending-Democracy-publication-online.pdf - Hybrid Attacks – Civil Today’s Investigative Coverage on Information Disorder
https://civil.today/category/information-disorder/hybrid-attacks/ - Russia using Serbian agent to infiltrate EU bodies, Western intel says – Politico
https://www.politico.eu/article/russia-use-serbia-agent-spy-infiltrate-eu-institutions-western-intelligence/ - European Parliament Committee on Foreign Affairs (AFET) – Draft Report: Thomas Waitz (2023/2024 Reports on North Macedonia)
https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/AFET-AM-771966_EN.pdf - OCCRP: The Secret Russian Network in the Balkans
https://www.occrp.org/en/investigations/the-secret-russian-network-in-the-balkans - NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence – Russian Narratives and Influence in the Western Balkans
https://stratcomcoe.org/publications/russian-narratives-and-influence-in-the-western-balkans/128 - Freedom House – Nations in Transit: North Macedonia
https://freedomhouse.org/country/north-macedonia/nations-transit/2024 - Balkan Insight – Serbian Influence in the Western Balkans
https://balkaninsight.com/2022/11/16/serbias-soft-power-influence-in-the-western-balkans/ - Foreign Affairs – How Russia Weaponizes Information
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/russian-federation/2016-03-01/how-russia-weaponizes-information - Brookings Institution – The Kremlin’s Disinformation Playbook
https://www.brookings.edu/articles/the-kremlins-disinformation-playbook/ - Council of Europe – Propaganda and Freedom of the Media
https://rm.coe.int/16806f5b73 - Atlantic Council – Disinformation in the Western Balkans
https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/disinformation-in-the-western-balkans/ - Reporters Without Borders – Press Freedom Index: North Macedonia
https://rsf.org/en/country/north-macedonia - European External Action Service – Disinformation and Foreign Interference
https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/disinformation-and-foreign-interference_en - The Soufan Center – Russian Hybrid Threats in the Balkans
https://thesoufancenter.org/intelbrief-2023-march-15-russian-hybrid-threats-in-the-balkans/ - Center for European Policy Analysis – Serbia as a Proxy for Kremlin Influence
https://cepa.org/article/serbia-as-a-proxy-for-kremlin-influence/ - Freedom House: North Macedonia
https://freedomhouse.org/country/north-macedonia - European Parliament: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and North Macedonia must step up reforms https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-10-2025-0157_EN.html
- European Commission: 2025 Rule of Law Report Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in North Macedonia
https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/ede31053-efc6-4dd0-89ed-c9224f7eeb70_en?filename=2025+Rule+of+Law+Report+-+Country+Chapter+North-Macedonia.pdf - PRIF Blog: Uprisings in Serbia. Struggle(s) against a resilient regime https://blog.prif.org/en/2025/03/21/uprisings-in-serbia-struggles-against-a-resilient-regime/
- Freedom House: Serbia
https://freedomhouse.org/country/serbia/freedom-world/2025
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