By Xhabir Deralla

Following the parliamentary elections of 12 April 2026, Hungary enters a new political phase. With a decisive victory, Péter Magyar brings to an end the 16-year rule (2010–2026) of Viktor Orbán. What follows will be shaped less by the election result itself—and far more by the legal and institutional architecture Orbán leaves behind.

Hungary’s 199-seat National Assembly requires 100 seats for a governing majority and 133 seats for constitutional change. Crossing that threshold provides the legal foundation for deep and rapid reforms.

Realistic scenarios for Magyar’s government

With projections placing TISZA between 130 and 135 seats, it is now evident that the party has secured a two-thirds majority in parliament. This significantly expands the scope of what the new government can attempt—and how quickly it can move.

Government formation could be completed within one to two weeks (mid–late April 2026), followed by parliamentary confirmation of the prime minister, the appointment of key ministers, and the launch of an initial legislative agenda within the first 30 to 60 days. The first 100 days (April–July 2026) will be politically decisive.

Yet the scale of the victory does not automatically translate into immediate systemic change.

Orbán’s system is embedded in a network of cardinal laws (sarkalatos törvények), which require a two-thirds majority to amend. These laws govern core areas of the state, including judicial oversight, media regulation, electoral rules, and the powers of the Constitutional Court.

With a two-thirds majority now secured, the new government has the legal capacity to revise these frameworks. In the short term (2026), this opens the way for constitutional amendments, reform of judicial oversight bodies, and restructuring of media governance. In the medium term (2026–2027), it enables the replacement of institutional leadership and the introduction of new regulatory frameworks.

At the same time, parts of the system are designed to endure beyond electoral cycles. Many key positions are secured through long-term mandates: the Chief Prosecutor serves a nine-year term, Constitutional Court judges up to twelve years, and members of the Media Council nine years. As these mandates extend well into the future, elements of the Orbán-era architecture may remain in place until 2028–2034, regardless of the change in government.

Enormous EU funds potential

Hungary currently has between €30 and €35 billion in EU funds frozen, suspended, or conditionally accessible—making this one of the most immediate and consequential dimensions of the post-election transition.

This includes approximately €22 billion in Cohesion Funds under the 2021–2027 Multiannual Financial Framework, as well as €10.4 billion from the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF). In addition, several billion euros remain approved but not disbursed, pending the fulfillment of previously agreed conditions.

These funds fall under multiple EU financial instruments and control mechanisms, most notably the Rule of Law Conditionality Mechanism (Regulation 2020/2092) and the RRF’s milestone-based disbursement system, which together determine the pace and scope of fund releases.

The timeline for unlocking these funds is likely to unfold in three phases.

In the immediate phase (Q2 2026), a new government could initiate negotiations with the European Commission, potentially enabling the release of limited pre-approved tranches that are already technically cleared but politically blocked.

In the short term (second half of 2026), Hungary could see partial unfreezing of funds, with the first meaningful disbursements—potentially amounting to several billion euros—depending on progress in meeting financial and administrative benchmarks tied to existing agreements.

Full access to the broader €30–35 billion envelope is likely from 2027 onward, and would be expected to proceed in staggered disbursements, rather than a single release, in line with standard EU budgetary controls and multi-annual programming cycles.

In practical terms, EU funding represents the largest immediate financial leverage available to the new government and the fastest measurable economic impact of the political shift.

Foreign policy recalibration

Hungary’s leadership ties with the Kremlin and its openly anti-Ukrainian stance have been more than problematic throughout these years. Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022, Hungary under Orbán has maintained obstructive positions on sanctions while continuing its energy ties with Moscow.

A Magyar government is expected to mark a stark contrast to these policies—aligning fully with EU sanctions regimes, supporting Ukraine politically and materially, and repositioning Hungary within NATO. This shift could begin within weeks of government formation.

Additionally, Magyar is expected to follow through on statements made during the election campaign, indicating that, if his Tisza Party won the April 2026 elections, his government would extradite specifically named Polish politicians—Zbigniew Ziobro and Marcin Romanowski—who were granted asylum in Hungary. He also stated that, under a Tisza government, Hungary would no longer serve as a safe haven for such individuals.

Former Prime Minister of North Macedonia and fugitive from justice, Nikola Gruevski, is among the figures close to Orbán’s regime who has enjoyed protection in Budapest since November 2018. Whether he will change his address for the second time in eight years remains to be seen—once Magyar decides to begin “clearing” Orbán’s guest list.

On the day following Magyar’s election victory, Poland’s Prime Minister Donald Tusk expressed hope that the two former Polish ministers granted political asylum in Hungary would be returned to face justice in light of the opposition Tisza Party’s victory.

Expected resistance from Orbán’s system

Orbán’s system was built to outlast electoral defeat. The transition will be anything but smooth.

A wave of legal challenges is likely already in April–May 2026, accompanied by institutional obstruction and the deliberate slowing of key processes. What follows will not be open confrontation, but something more persistent: managed resistance—quiet, procedural, and difficult to dismantle. We have seen this in North Macedonia, where the lack of political will and institutional response reversed reform processes. Caution and strategic thinking must therefore be matched with uncompromising action and sustained commitment.

Indeed, this resilience is the result of deliberate design—one that extends beyond any single political figure. It was consolidated and fully exploited under Orbán’s rule for political gain, rather than for the protection of democratic institutions. Crucially, this architecture is embedded through long-term institutional mandates. The Chief Prosecutor serves a nine-year term, Constitutional Court judges up to twelve years, and members of the Media Council nine years. As a result, key levers of influence may remain in place well beyond the current electoral cycle—potentially until 2028–2034—regardless of the change in government.

This phase of resistance could extend through at least the first two years of Magyar’s mandate, shaping both the pace and the limits of reform.

Media counter-campaigns are also expected to intensify. These will not be confined to Hungary. They are likely to be amplified through Kremlin-aligned networks and political actors across the Western Balkans, including Serbia, North Macedonia, Republika Srpska, and segments of the Croatian political scene, though such efforts are not confined to these actors alone. The narrative will be familiar: delegitimization, disinformation, and attempts to frame change as instability.

The central challenge

With turnout reaching 77–78 percent, expectations are exceptionally high—perhaps unrealistically so.

Magyar will need to deliver visible results within the first 100 days, while sustaining momentum over the next two years, if not the entire four-year mandate. The challenge is not only to dismantle an entrenched system, but to do so without reproducing its logic—without concentrating power in new ways or weakening the institutions he seeks to restore.

The election of 12 April 2026 changed who holds power. But the system—shaped by law, institutions, and networks—will take years to transform. Beyond the transition of government, a long institutional reckoning lies ahead for Hungary.

Xhabir Deralla is a journalist, analyst, and President of CIVIL – Center for Freedom.

© Xhabir Deralla / CIVIL – Center for Freedom, 2026.
Republishing permitted with prior written consent.

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