VSquare reports that Hungary quietly expelled Artur Sushkov, a Russian diplomat identified by Hungarian authorities as an officer of Russia’s Foreign Intelligence Service, the SVR. Sushkov, a 36-year-old third secretary at the Russian Embassy in Budapest, left Hungary with his wife on May 4, 2026. According to VSquare’s Hungarian government sources, the expulsion came only after Viktor Orbán’s electoral defeat on April 12, 2026, which removed the political protection that had delayed action against him for months. Hungarian counterintelligence reportedly wanted him expelled as early as February, but Orbán’s government blocked the move during the election campaign, when Moscow was allegedly supporting Orbán’s reelection effort.
Sushkov’s case is part of a broader pattern under Orbán: Hungarian intelligence services identified Russian espionage threats, but political leadership allegedly prevented or softened responses in order to avoid confrontation with Moscow. Former counterintelligence officer Péter Buda is quoted as saying that the political leadership did not allow the services to do their work properly, making Hungary an attractive environment for hostile intelligence operations. The expulsion was handled quietly, consistent with Budapest’s previous approach to Russian diplomats suspected of espionage: minimizing public friction with the Kremlin while still formally removing the operative.
Sushkov’s operation, according to the report, focused on think tanks and academic institutions close to the Orbán government, especially those linked to Balázs Orbán, the prime minister’s political director and later campaign chief. These included the Mathias Corvinus Collegium, the Hungarian Institute of International Affairs, and the John Lukacs Institute for Strategy and Politics at Ludovika University of Public Service. The last of these is especially sensitive because Ludovika trains Hungarian military, law enforcement, and intelligence personnel. The article argues that these institutions formed a friendly environment for Russian intelligence activity because many were ideologically aligned with anti-Western or pro-Kremlin narratives.
Sushkov had been posted to Hungary twice: first from 2019 to 2022, and then again from February 2023, after being promoted from attaché to third secretary. His wife Svetlana, also expelled, was officially employed by the Russian Foreign Ministry’s Diplomatic Academy. The article also highlights oddities in the couple’s Russian registration records, including addresses linked to a hotel and a shopping mall in Kaliningrad, raising questions about their official residential documentation. Leaked flight data reportedly show Sushkov traveling between Budapest and Russia, including several trips to Kaliningrad after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine began.
The core of the article concerns Sushkov’s alleged recruitment activity. VSquare says he aggressively networked at conferences and events organized by MCC and HIIA, seeking off-the-record meetings with people connected to Orbán-era decision-makers. A Hungarian national security source described MCC as a “revolving door,” suggesting that Russian operatives could access useful circles without classic recruitment methods. MCC told VSquare it did not officially invite Sushkov or other Russian diplomats to events, but acknowledged that open programs were accessible to anyone, sometimes without registration.
According to one Hungarian source, Sushkov began recruiting at least three individuals. One alleged asset, a researcher connected to HIIA and the John Lukacs Institute, was reportedly trained in clandestine communication and attended secure meetings. Sushkov allegedly cultivated the person with expensive gifts and suggested that money would be available in exchange for information. Through this network, he obtained political intelligence from HIIA, which operates under the Prime Minister’s Cabinet Office and includes staff who prepare materials for Viktor Orbán. His interests reportedly ranged from government gossip and election campaign developments to Hungary’s foreign policy, Budapest’s relationship with Ukraine, the Paks 2 nuclear project, and even an internal HIIA Wi-Fi password.
HIIA and the John Lukacs Institute denied knowledge of improper contact or closed-door participation by Sushkov, while acknowledging limited public-event attendance or security-awareness procedures. Hungarian counterintelligence, in cooperation with an unnamed NATO partner agency, initially considered whether Sushkov could be turned, but once that failed, he and his wife were expelled for violating the Vienna Convention, a diplomatic formula often used in espionage cases.
VSquare concludes that the case is not isolated. At least a dozen suspected or identified SVR officers reportedly remain under diplomatic cover in Budapest, not counting GRU and FSB personnel. The article frames Hungary as a permissive operational environment for Russian intelligence, with consequences extending beyond Hungary itself to the wider Schengen area and Europe’s confrontation with Russian hybrid warfare.
Source: VSQUARE