By Xhabir Deralla
Propaganda narratives heavily rely on allusions, symbols, and coded language, often lacking any factual content. Even when facts are present, they are so distorted that they no longer serve as truth but as tools for disinformation. Facts are twisted to fit propaganda, blurring the line between reality and fiction. These constructions are designed to “remind” the targeted audience of situations and events from the present and the past, thus inciting and exacerbating interethnic and political tensions.
Destabilization has become one of the key words used to describe the Macedonian reality and forecasts for the development of the situation.
The ruling VMRO-DPMNE[1] unceasingly maintains its long-standing nationalist narratives, often sloppily concealing them behind relentless attacks on DUI[2]. These attacks intensify during election campaigns and have remained the main narrative since Mickoski’s government was formed. On the other hand, DUI’s main target was and remains the “vassals” from the VLEN coalition[3]. Interestingly, DUI seems to be directing its counterattacks against VMRO-DPMNE more towards VLEN than against VMRO itself. They likely hope to find themselves in a situation similar to 2008, when DUI’s irreconcilable opponent, Nikola Gruevski[4], nevertheless recruited them into a government coalition after early parliamentary elections, and happily ruled together for almost a decade. And SDSM[5], or at least what’s left of the party, chooses to flirt with nationalist narratives and mostly targets VLEN, having previously completely distanced itself from DUI. It goes without saying that ZNAM[6] (ruling coalition partner) and the far-right Levica[7] are competing in what they know best—nationalism. VLEN is a colorful new coalition that has yet to build political capital as a coalition, and they are struggling. They are slowly forming common positions and, at least for the time being, are not managing the situation effectively, leaving little room for a precise assessment of their orientation and capacities.
Even before the elections, Mickoski spoke about an associate of Ali Ahmeti (DUI’s leader) who allegedly enjoyed a luxury hotel in Istanbul and, from the comfort of that hotel, controlled an alleged armed group that moved through Skopje’s ethnically mixed municipalities of Butel and Chair. His friend, lawyer and Minister of the Interior Panče Toškovski, fully supports Mickoski’s story and assures that the threat exists, but that citizens should not be worried. It’s as if he’s saying, “Our house is really on fire, but you don’t need to be afraid—we are here, we will put the fire out.”
These and similar claims, supported by zero facts and evidence, were also expressed in Prime Minister Mickoski’s statement at a joint press conference with Kosovo Prime Minister Albin Kurti. It remains unclear whether and to what extent Kurti himself participated in this scenario, or if he left with a lump in his throat. (link: press conference in Macedonian)
One thing is clear: they all use nationalist narratives and messages together—some less, some more—sometimes hidden behind coded language, and most of the time quite openly. Nationalism remains the cheapest investment with the highest and fastest political profit.
What’s the point?
Mickoski has been claiming for months that DUI is preparing to destabilize the country. And here he engages in cryptic statements with “aha-I-caught-you” stories that, for months on end, he spices up with “convincing details” for which he does not present any evidence, much less address at the institutional level. When the prime minister and the interior minister claim that there is a conspiracy to destabilize the security of the country, you expect an institutional reaction, not fearmongering from the podium and in front of the cameras.
The country is indeed facing destabilization. But it won’t be caused by DUI, or rather—it won’t be caused by DUI alone—because they lack both the capacity and the interest. The nationalistic narratives of all the actors on the political stage, the so-called extras, stuntmen, and opportunists, will lead to tensions, perhaps even to a security crisis of an ethnic nature. Armed with nationalism, all together, but primarily Mickoski and his team, will use all their propaganda capacities to avoid responsibility for the failures on the political, economic, and social levels, and mostly for the failure to continue with European integration. Everyone needs destabilization as an excuse, and Albanians as a punching bag.