By Ambassador Gudrun Steinacker (ret.)

After Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, EU enlargement appears to have gained new momentum, including in the Western Balkans. Twenty-three years after the promise made in Thessaloniki, the EU now seeks to demonstrate—particularly with regard to Montenegro and Albania—that it remains open to new members.

Certainly, there are few illusions in Brussels about the difficulties these so-called frontrunners among the Western Balkan candidate countries face in implementing the EU acquis. Nor are there illusions about the resistance to enlargement in some EU member states.

There is still no formal timeline for enlargement, although the years 2029–2030 are often mentioned. Until then, the situation within the EU may change significantly. In several member states, enlargement remains unpopular.

At the same time, the “controlled democracies” in Hungary and Slovakia advocate enlargement, hoping that the inclusion of hybrid democracies could strengthen their illiberal political model and help advance their ambition to transform the EU from within.

Montenegro appears best suited to provide a positive example. With around 620,000 inhabitants and a GDP comparable to that of a medium-sized German town, it poses neither a security risk nor a serious challenge for financial or economic integration into the EU. The country has been a NATO member since 2017.

Even Montenegro’s entanglement with corrupt structures and networks of organized crime could, in principle, be addressed. After all, such problems also exist within some EU member states, and the Union has rules and mechanisms to confront them.

Nevertheless, enlargement without the necessary conditions being met could create considerable problems. The accession of Romania and Bulgaria serves as a cautionary example. Even after almost twenty years of EU membership, the situation in both countries remains difficult and unstable, not least due to persistent shortcomings in the rule of law. They illustrate the EU’s limited capacity to ensure sustainable transformation once accession has taken place.

The EU’s failure to insist on genuine reforms in candidate countries—particularly in the area of the judiciary and in the implementation of demanding chapters of the acquis, such as Chapter 27 on “Environmental Protection and Nature Conservation”—would be detrimental not only to the accession country but also to the EU itself.

It is therefore necessary to identify the reasons behind the persistent deficits in the Western Balkan candidate countries. These challenges are not recent and are linked, among other factors, to more than thirty-five years of neoliberal transformation. Proponents of rapid accession, particularly within the European Commission, often tend to overlook or downplay these structural problems.

The renowned Balkan historian Maria Todorova writes about the harsh consequences of these neoliberal capitalist experiments (Maria Todorova, Balkan Mission Impossible, 2025). The transformation of economic systems from socialism to neoliberal capitalism led to profound disruptions. Privatization, in particular, proved to be an extremely difficult challenge across the former communist countries. In many Balkan states, industrialization had largely taken place during the socialist period.

Unfortunately, the elites in the European Economic Community—called the European Union since 1992—paid little attention to the fact that it was often former communist elites, particularly those emerging from the secret services, who took “control of the economy” without much regard for the rule of law (Martin K. Dimitrov, From Spies to Oligarchs, 2009).

In the former Yugoslavia, the consequences of a decade of wars compounded these problems. Quite a number of war profiteers later became beneficiaries of privatization. At the same time, meaningful efforts to confront the past—whether the crimes committed under communist regimes or those committed during the turbulent post-communist period—have largely been absent.

As a result, many people in the Balkan states today feel a certain nostalgia for the “leaden,” yet supposedly stable period under communism. The crimes, mismanagement, corruption, and repression associated with the nomenklatura regimes are often pushed aside or gradually forgotten.

In its effort to demonstrate that enlargement is possible, Brussels now appears increasingly willing to accept half-hearted reforms and tolerate significant deficits—not only in the so-called frontrunner countries.

Faced with a new geopolitical reality—Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, hybrid threats emanating from Russia, the opportunistic involvement of China and other actors from Turkey, the Middle East, and beyond, as well as the disruptive signals coming from MAGA-influenced politics in the United States—Brussels and several EU capitals have come to view enlargement as having no viable alternative.

At the same time, many of the obstacles to a faster enlargement process are caused by the EU itself. It has too often been convenient to accommodate corrupt or kleptocratic elites in these countries and to accept the outcomes of dubious elections.

Neither has the conflict between Serbia and Kosovo been resolved, nor do five EU member states still recognize Kosovo’s independence. Internally divided North Macedonia remains blocked by the EU member state Bulgaria. Meanwhile, in Washington, Milorad Dodik and Dragan Čović—the Serb and Croat leaders from Bosnia and Herzegovina—are calling for the replacement of the Dayton Agreement, the country’s de facto constitution. Although Dayton is certainly a flawed document, it remains, for the time being, the guarantee of the existence of an inclusive Bosnian state.

Serbia, for its part, often provokes the EU while simultaneously benefiting from EU subsidies. Many observers consider Brussels’ response weak and contradictory.

The doyen of foreign correspondents in Austria, the 96-year-old Paul Lendvai—born in Hungary—describes in his book Blind Spot Politics: Appeasement, Authoritarianism and Hypocrisy in Europe (2025) what he sees as the hypocrisy of Germany, Austria, and Europe as a whole in dealing with autocratic leaders in Russia, the Balkans, and Hungary, his country of origin.

Is there a way out for Europe from this catch-22 situation—caught between the dictatorships of China and Russia, MAGA-influenced politics in the United States, and an increasing number of autocracies across the world?

The EU should act with greater determination, using both carrot and stick. It must keep a tighter rein on the so-called frontrunners and demand genuine reforms—not only on paper, but implemented in practice. EU membership should be the reward for the full implementation of the EU acquis. This could also become an important incentive for the other candidate countries.

In the face of climate change—which does not care about geopolitics—and the loss of biodiversity threatening livelihoods everywhere, the still largely preserved natural resources of the Western Balkans could make a significant contribution to addressing these challenges in Europe. However, this will only succeed if Brussels and EU member states show real political will, end deeply rooted hypocrisy, put greater pressure on Western Balkan elites, and encourage civil society.

Perhaps the EU should even ask its own member states to assess their performance on the basis of the EU acquis.

Gudrun Steinacker is a former German Ambassador and a board member of the EuroNatur Foundation, with extensive experience in regional diplomacy, human rights, and environmental advocacy in Southeast Europe.