Based on an analysis by Emanuele Errichiello (LSE / Centro Studi Internazionali)

The European Union launched its new Pact for the Mediterranean on 28 November, presenting it as a strategic framework for renewing relations with its southern neighbours. It comes with a new institutional architecture, including a dedicated Commissioner for the Mediterranean and an Action Plan marking the 30th anniversary of the 1995 Barcelona Declaration.

But according to political analyst Emanuele Errichiello, writing for the LSE Europp Blog, the Pact represents less a paradigm shift than a rearticulation of the EU’s existing, interest-driven approach to the region.

New structure, familiar strategy

The most significant change introduced by the Pact is institutional. The Mediterranean is now managed through a distinct policy track inside the European Commission, separate from enlargement and the eastern neighbourhood. This confirms that the EU no longer treats the region as part of a broader political integration project, but as a space to be governed through specialised policy instruments.

Substantively, however, the toolkit remains familiar: investment frameworks, regulatory convergence, migration management, security cooperation, and sectoral dialogues — largely designed and steered from Brussels.

Three pillars, uneven priorities

The Pact is built around three pillars: People; Stronger and more integrated economies; and Security, preparedness and migration management.

While the “People” pillar contains language on civil society, youth exchanges, and cultural cooperation, these initiatives depend heavily on political will and sustained funding — areas where past EU efforts have struggled.

By contrast, the security and migration pillar is the most concrete and operational, focusing on border control, returns and readmission, anti-smuggling, maritime security, and CSDP missions — reflecting the immediate political pressures within the EU.

The economic and energy pillar, centred on clean energy and diversification away from Russian gas, offers opportunities but also risks reinforcing old dependency patterns, with southern partners serving primarily as providers of energy and infrastructure for European markets.

Partnership in words, asymmetry in practice

Although the Pact uses the language of “co-ownership” and “joint responsibility”, the underlying relationship remains asymmetrical. The EU defines priorities, designs instruments, and controls resources, while southern partners are expected to align with frameworks set in Brussels.

At the same time, deeply political issues — such as authoritarian drift, shrinking civic space, corruption, and social protest — are largely absent from the Pact, replaced by technical terms like “resilience”, “capacity-building”, and “investment climate”.

A more crowded Mediterranean

The Pact also reflects a changing geopolitical landscape. The Mediterranean is no longer a quasi-exclusive European sphere of influence. Gulf states, Turkey, Russia, and China are now major actors, and the EU increasingly must negotiate its role rather than simply project it.

This creates a tension: the EU seeks to preserve control over security and economic agendas in a region that is increasingly resistant to unilateral agenda-setting.

Three tests ahead

Errichiello identifies three political tests for the Pact’s future relevance: whether member states will treat it as a common framework rather than pursue bilateral deals; whether people-centred initiatives will receive comparable political and financial backing to security policies; and whether the EU will confront uncomfortable questions about its own role in sustaining authoritarian stability and inequality in the region.

For now, the Pact for the Mediterranean looks less like a transformation than a refinement — a more coherent and securitised version of the EU’s post-2011 approach, presented under a new label.

Prepared by: Civil.Today Editorial Desk

Based on:  The new Pact for the Mediterranean – a rebrand or something more? by Emanuele Errichiello (LSE / Centro Studi Internazionali), published on the LSE Europp Blog, 5 January 2026. Read the full article here.

About the author cited

Emanuele Errichiello is an ESRC PhD candidate in the Department of International Relations at the London School of Economics and Deputy Director of the Centro Studi Internazionali, an independent think tank in Italy. His research focuses on Euro-Mediterranean political and economic relations.

Centro Studi Internazionali is a partner organisation within the Westminster Alliance for Ukraine (Defending Democracy Global Initiative).