In his address at the international conference „Defending Democracy: Horizons of Freedom“, Emanuele Errichiello, Board Member of Centro Studi Internazionale, offered a critical reflection on the state of democracy and the liberal international order. He argued that contemporary challenges to democracy no longer come only from external authoritarian powers, but increasingly from within democratic systems themselves. Drawing on recent strategic shifts in the United States and the European Union, Errichiello warned that the normative foundations of the liberal international order—democracy, human rights, and the rule-based system—are being progressively sidelined in favor of pragmatism, security, and great‑power competition:

I think that, having said that, there are two issues I really want to discuss. I am not sure whether previous speakers have already addressed them, as I could not be present earlier, but I will try to follow the discussion from this point onward.

The first issue is that the attack on the democratic order—and on the democratic liberal international order—is coming both from outside and from within. This is something we really need to reflect on seriously.

A few days ago, the United States published its new grand strategy. That document was quite straightforward about the U.S. position vis‑à‑vis Europe and the world. The Trump doctrine clearly states that the United States is no longer seeking to build or sustain a global liberal international order. Instead, it openly embraces a state of great‑power competition, accepting a multipolar world in which the U.S. positions itself as a superpower competing with other major powers.

This is extremely important. Until now, whether we liked it or not, there has been an attempt to combine a pragmatic, realpolitik approach with a normative one. This was true not only for the United States but also for the European Union. The message was clear: if you want political cooperation, trade relations, development assistance, or support for infrastructure projects, there are conditions. These conditions included a rule‑based governance system, democracy, respect for human rights, and openness to international and domestic markets.

Today, this approach is disappearing—and this is something we need to think about very carefully. When we look at the U.S., from the trade wars to the new grand strategy, and when we examine the European Union’s most recent documents, including the new Pact for the Mediterranean, we see not only a shift toward pragmatism, but also a clear abandonment of the normative dimension. Democracy and human rights, which once epitomized the liberal international order, are no longer central priorities.

This leads to a crucial point: what we are facing is not simply a crisis of democracies. It is a crisis of the democratic liberal international order as a whole. We have reached a stage where it is increasingly difficult to describe the global system as one predominantly governed by liberal norms and democratic values.

This is not only because of Russia, China, or other powers that challenge democracy and offer alternative, non‑democratic models of governance. It is also because, from within, we have accepted that the order we operate in has fundamentally changed—and that the majority of the global system is no longer democratic.

For this reason, we must be careful not to focus our analytical attention solely on external factors. External actors certainly matter, but the challenges to democracy today are also internal. Europe provides a clear example. Across the continent, we see the rise of anti‑European movements and parties with authoritarian tendencies, both inside and outside government. While some of these actors may have links to external powers, such as Russia, this is not the whole story. Something deeper is changing within our own political systems.

The world we knew before 2008 no longer exists. I have argued this repeatedly. In the 1990s and early 2000s, many believed in the triumph of the West, the “end of history,” and the permanence of liberal democracy. This was clearly a mistake. We are now living through a transition phase, the outcome of which remains uncertain. What is clear, however, is that we are moving toward a global order that is no longer liberal—a multipolar system in which most poles are not democratic.

Even the pole that is considered democratic increasingly places democracy, human rights, and the rule‑based order in a secondary position, both domestically and in its external action. A striking example is the European Union’s latest documents on external relations. I strongly encourage you to read the new Pact for the Mediterranean. It reflects a clear retreat from the EU’s traditional normative agenda. Democracy and human rights are mentioned only marginally, while security, stability, economic relations, and migration dominate the agenda.

Just ten years ago, the message was very different: if you wanted EU cooperation, funding, or political support, democratic reforms and respect for human rights were non‑negotiable. Today, these principles are no longer prioritized. This is something we must question seriously. It shows that the democratic and rule‑based elements of our order are under pressure from both outside and inside.

Let me conclude with a point on resilience, which is the core theme of this panel. I do not believe in a civilizational clash, and I want to be clear about that. However, precisely because the global order is shifting in the direction I have described, Europe must stand together more than ever. Europe should aim to be an alternative—a model that does not simply follow the prevailing trend, but instead offers a credible reference point grounded in democracy and the rule‑based order.

Europe has both the material and ideational capacity to project such a model. It should choose to do so. The United States will remain an ally, and transatlantic relations are still fundamental. But the U.S. has made it clear that Europe is no longer its primary priority. This means the European Union must mature politically and ask itself a fundamental question: what do we stand for?

Do we simply follow the global trend, or do we take a firm stance on our identity as a normative actor committed to democracy, human rights, and a rule‑based international order? This is the question we need to confront today.

This article and refined transcript were prepared by the author with AI-assisted language refinement and editorial support. The content remains fully faithful to the original video address. All responsibility for interpretation and publication rests with the author.

Watch the full video from the conference: