By Xhabir Deralla
When we marked the fourth year since the beginning of Russia’s full-scale war of aggression against Ukraine on 24 February, one of our colleagues, Kateryna Pavlova, joined us via Zoom from Kyiv. She warned us she did not have much time—only twelve minutes before the electricity would be cut.
She said it with a smile.
It was not irony, nor resignation. It was something we have, by now, come to recognize: a quiet, almost disarming stoicism that has come to define Ukrainian resilience. A calm acknowledgment of disruption—paired with an unyielding determination to continue.
This is what war looks like in Ukraine today.
Not only on the frontlines—where the Kremlin’s military machine has repeatedly failed to deliver decisive results against a smaller but far more adaptive Ukrainian army—but in homes, hospitals, schools, and entire cities. From the very first days of the invasion, civilians and civilian infrastructure have been deliberate targets.
As the war has evolved, so too has its logic.
Russia now wages a dual assault: one of fire, and one of cold.
If missiles and drones do not kill, then winter will. By systematically destroying energy infrastructure, the Kremlin has turned cold and darkness into weapons—aimed not at military positions, but at the survival of millions of civilians.
The Energy Front: War Against Society
This strategy did not emerge overnight. It became more pronounced after Ukraine began regaining territory in late 2022, when Russia shifted toward a war of attrition targeting critical infrastructure—above all, the energy system. Early assessments already pointed to severe damage. By June 2022, the Kyiv School of Economics estimated losses in the energy sector at $11.6 billion.
Damages, losses and reconstruction and recovery needs by sector breakdown, in monetary terms, as of June 13, 2022, $blns (Source: Kyiv School of Economics)
The situation worsened dramatically during the winter of 2022–2023, as waves of coordinated strikes aimed to overwhelm the system at peak demand. According to a Kyiv School of Economics report published in July 2023, total infrastructure losses had reached an estimated $265.6 billion by June 2023, including $27.2 billion in damage to the energy sector alone since the start of the full-scale invasion. These losses have only continued to grow.
Total estimate of infrastructure damages as of June 2023 (Source: Kyiv School of Economics)
Damages by type of property, $ billion (Source: Kyiv School of Economics)
Moscow’s calculation was straightforward: prolonged energy deprivation would weaken Ukraine’s military capacity, strain its economy, and erode civilian resilience.
It failed.
Despite sustained attacks, Ukraine’s energy system did not collapse. The state adapted under pressure, supported by significant international assistance—financial, technical, and humanitarian—which helped sustain basic functionality and prevent a systemic breakdown.
Air defense systems have reduced the effectiveness of Russian strikes, though never eliminating the threat.
And yet, the scale of destruction has continued to grow.
By early 2026, roughly half of Ukraine’s energy capacity had been damaged, destroyed, or occupied. A February 2026 report by Kyiv School of Economics estimates total sector losses at $75.3 billion. Generation capacity has dropped to nearly one-third of pre-invasion levels, while more than 63,000 energy-related facilities have been affected—driving repeated blackouts and escalating humanitarian risks.
This leads to a broader and unavoidable conclusion: Russia’s war against Ukraine has never been confined to trenches and frontlines. It is a war against systems—against the very infrastructure that sustains modern society. Nowhere is this more evident than in the systematic targeting of Ukraine’s energy sector.
The latest strategic framework presented by Ukraine’s Ministry of Energy for 2026–2027 captures both dimensions of this reality. It is, at once, a record of destruction and a blueprint for survival.
What emerges from it is not only a plan to keep the lights on during war, but a vision for building a resilient, European-integrated energy system—built under conditions of continuous attack.
The numbers alone reveal the scale and intent of Russia’s campaign.
Ukraine has lost more than 6 GW of generation capacity during the current heating season. At peak demand of around 18 GW, the system faces a deficit of up to 6.5 GW—a structural gap that cannot be bridged through conventional repair cycles.
This is not collateral damage. It is systemic warfare.
By targeting energy infrastructure, Russia is deliberately attacking the functioning of Ukrainian society: heating, hospitals, water systems, and basic human security. Up to 15 million people are at risk of outages, while total damage exceeds €15 billion, with more than 60% of generation capacity affected.
Under such conditions, Ukraine rightly concludes: this is no longer a reconstruction problem. It is a wartime resilience challenge.
From recovery to wartime resilience – Energy Ramstein
Traditional post-conflict recovery models assume stability. Ukraine operates in the opposite reality—continuous attack.
Its strategic objective reflects this shift: to stabilize the energy system during war while simultaneously building an EU-integrated energy sector.
This dual-track approach—survival and transformation—is one of the most important strategic innovations in Ukraine’s policy thinking.
To achieve this, Ukraine proposes a three-pillar support architecture: macro-financial assistance to maintain liquidity and fund rapid repairs, targeted investment mechanisms to drive decentralization and modernization, and humanitarian support to sustain critical services during peak disruption.
The message is clear: humanitarian aid saves lives—but only systemic investment stabilizes the state.
Within this shift, one of the most politically significant proposals is the creation of a unified coordination mechanism—informally dubbed “Energy Ramstein.”
Modeled on military coordination formats, this architecture introduces a simple but powerful logic: needs, financing, projects, and deliveries—aligned within a single operational pipeline and supported at political, operational, and technical levels. This replaces fragmented donor approaches with a single, coherent pipeline of decision-making, structured across three levels: political (EU, G7, international financial institutions), operational (a Kyiv-based coordination center), and technical (implementation and tracking platforms).
If implemented effectively, this could become a new model for managing large-scale infrastructure resilience under wartime conditions—not only for Ukraine, but for future crises globally.
Stability, deterrence, and the cost of war
The past winter demonstrated the fragility of the system under sustained attack, but also the effectiveness of coordinated support. Ukraine continues to face urgent needs for gas imports, repairs, and system stabilization, with financing gaps measured in billions of euros.
Early and predictable support is not simply helpful—it is decisive. Delays increase both humanitarian risk and long-term recovery costs. In this context, energy policy becomes humanitarian policy.
But resilience alone is not enough.
Ukraine’s strategy also addresses a critical gap in the current international response: the lack of direct consequences for attacks on civilian infrastructure.
The proposal is bold and overdue: automatic financial penalties linked to verified strikes, the use of immobilized Russian sovereign assets for compensation, and expanded sanctions targeting energy revenues, Rosatom, and Russia’s shadow fleet.
This is not only about justice—it is about deterrence.
As long as attacks on energy infrastructure remain cost-free for the aggressor, they will continue. Turning financial pressure into a preventive mechanism could fundamentally alter the calculus of hybrid warfare.
Beyond repair: Building a resilient system
One of the most important lessons of this war is clear: restoration without protection leads only to repeated destruction.
Ukraine’s strategy therefore emphasizes hardening critical infrastructure, strengthening cybersecurity, integrating protection with air defense where feasible, and accelerating decentralized energy solutions at the municipal level.
Decentralization, in particular, is emerging as a cornerstone of resilience. Smaller, distributed systems—cogeneration units, modular heating, local grids—are harder to destroy and faster to restore.
This marks a structural shift away from centralized energy systems toward resilience-oriented design.
A strategic choice for Europe
Ukraine’s energy resilience is not a national issue—it is a European security question.
A stable Ukrainian energy system protects regional energy flows, contributes to market stability, reduces the risk of wider economic shocks, and strengthens the EU’s geopolitical credibility. Conversely, failure to stabilize it would export instability—economically, politically, and strategically.
Ukraine has presented a coherent, forward-looking strategy. It recognizes that modern warfare targets systems, not just territory. It adapts to continuous disruption. And it proposes mechanisms—financial, technical, and political—that go beyond reactive aid.
What remains uncertain is not Ukraine’s strategy—but Europe’s response.
Will the EU and its partners move from fragmented support to unified strategic coordination? Will they introduce real deterrence mechanisms against attacks on civilian infrastructure? Will they treat energy resilience as collective security, not just reconstruction?
The answers to these questions will shape not only Ukraine’s future—but Europe’s capacity to withstand the next phase of hybrid warfare.
Because in this war, electricity is not just power.
It is survival.
This article was developed with the assistance of AI (ChatGPT).