Edward P. Joseph is a leading American voice on the Balkans and a prominent expert on conflict management, diplomacy, and democratic resilience in fragile regions. He is currently a Lecturer at Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) and a widely respected foreign policy analyst with more than 15 years of experience working in some of the world’s most volatile conflict and post-conflict environments.

In recent months, Joseph has attracted significant attention in Washington policy circles for his Balkans-centered strategic initiative aimed at strengthening Ukraine’s position and weakening Russian influence in Europe. His proposal — to bring Serbia into NATO while applying elements of the Kosovo model to Ukraine’s Donbas region — was discussed at a U.S. congressional hearing and elaborated in his SAIS analysis, “Balkans Breakthrough for Ukraine: Bring Serbia into NATO, the Kosovo Model into the Donbas.”

Joseph has worked extensively in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, North Macedonia, Haiti, Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan, leading high-stakes negotiations, election observation missions, and crisis response efforts. During the Bosnian war, he coordinated the evacuation of Žepa amid the Srebrenica massacres, negotiating directly with Serb commander Ratko Mladić — an experience that later contributed to landmark war crimes proceedings at The Hague. As Deputy Head of the OSCE Mission in Kosovo, he played a decisive role in defusing a potentially violent confrontation between Belgrade and Pristina, earning recognition from U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton.

Beyond field operations, Joseph is a prolific policy commentator and author, with more than 50 published articles in leading international outlets, including Foreign Affairs, where his essay “The Balkans, Interrupted” was named one of the magazine’s Best of 2015. He is the former Executive Director of the Institute of Current World Affairs and currently serves as President of the National Council on U.S.-Libya Relations. His policy research includes the influential January 2021 SAIS–Wilson Center report on European non-recognition of Kosovo and its destabilizing impact on the region, as well as numerous analyses on NATO, EU enlargement, and democratic resilience.

A U.S. Army veteran and trained helicopter pilot, Joseph holds degrees from Johns Hopkins University, SAIS, and a Juris Doctor from the University of Virginia. He speaks Serbo-Croatian, French, Italian, and Spanish.

Jabir Deralla: Professor Joseph, thank you very much for being with us today. This is truly an exclusive opportunity, particularly in light of your latest initiative — the proposal to bring Serbia into NATO and to apply elements of the Kosovo model to the Donbas region.

This idea was discussed recently at a U.S. congressional hearing and has sparked considerable interest. To begin, could you briefly explain the core concept behind your Balkans proposal and why you believe it could change the strategic dynamics of the war in Ukraine?

Edward P. Joseph: Thank you very much for the opportunity — it’s a pleasure to be with you and your important audience.

My approach would have a transformative impact on the Balkans, and a supplementary but significant impact on ending the war in Ukraine. These are two different levels of effect.

The most profound impact would be regional. Transforming the Balkans would indirectly affect the war in Ukraine by placing additional pressure on Vladimir Putin. My proposal would result in Russia — and China as well — losing their primary avenues of influence in the region.

Let me give you one striking statistic on China: 96 percent of Chinese foreign investment in the Balkans is in Serbia.

As for Russia, Serbia remains the platform through which Moscow continues to exert influence in the region — most notably by exploiting the Kosovo issue. This same logic has been directly applied by Putin in the Ukraine theater, and we should be very clear about that.

For Vladimir Putin, Kosovo is not an abstract issue. It is deeply personal. He views the 1999 NATO intervention in Kosovo as something that occurred when Russia was weak and marginalized. It became part of his broader grievance against the West. When he famously said that the collapse of the Soviet Union was the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the 20th century, Kosovo symbolized that humiliation.

That grievance still weighs heavily on him.

So when I say that bringing Serbia into NATO would have a significant impact, I mean it quite literally. Putin has built much of his political career attacking the 1999 Kosovo intervention and using it as a justification for aggression in Ukraine.

I would compare this move to the sinking of the Moskva. Removing Serbia from Russia’s orbit and bringing it into NATO would be like taking away Russia’s flagship in the Balkans.

Jabir Deralla: How realistic is such a shift? What conditions or incentives would need to be in place for Serbia to reconsider its longstanding positions?

Edward P. Joseph: That is a completely valid question — and I can give you several reasons why this is far more plausible than many assume.

Let me start with the current geopolitical context.

First, Serbia is already under significant pressure. As raised in the congressional hearings, Belgrade is facing pressure from the Trump administration regarding the Russian-owned company Gazprom Neft and its control of NIS. These sanctions were imposed by the Biden administration late in its term, and the Trump administration has stopped extending exemptions. I would argue that this pressure should even be accelerated, pushing Serbia toward nationalizing NIS.

In other words, Serbia is already being pushed to break structural ties with Russia. This proposal does not emerge from a vacuum — it fits directly into existing realities.

Second, President Vučić is facing a deep internal political crisis. He is reluctant to call elections, which is itself telling. In moments of crisis, leaders sometimes accept options that previously seemed unthinkable because they reshape political calculations.

Third, this proposal would not come from just anyone — it would come from President Donald Trump, who remains extremely popular in Serbia. As with the NIS issue, Vučić cannot simply dismiss Trump’s position. A NATO pathway proposed by Trump would carry substantial political weight in Serbia.

Fourth, this would not mean instant NATO membership. Both Serbia and Kosovo would be offered a pathway — a formal commitment to NATO — but full membership would still require qualification. What would happen immediately, however, is a breakthrough in relations.

President Trump could invite the leaders of Serbia and Kosovo — as he did during his first administration — to Washington to sign an agreement. In that agreement, both sides would formally commit to NATO as a strategic objective.

Crucially, Vučić would receive something concrete. He would obtain a signed EU statute establishing the Association of Serb-Majority Municipalities in Kosovo — something Serbia, the EU, and the U.S. have all sought. He would not be required to formally recognize Kosovo at that stage.

Recognition would become unavoidable later — when both countries are ready to join NATO — because allies must recognize each other. But by then, the context would be entirely different: dramatically reduced tensions and a fundamentally altered strategic orientation for Serbia.

Now let me give you the final — and perhaps most decisive — reason why any Serbian leader would find it extremely difficult to say no.

Kosovo would be offered this NATO pathway independently of Serbia.

If President Trump offers Kosovo a clear path toward NATO — conditional on implementing the Association of Serb-Majority Municipalities and fully integrating Kosovo Serbs as equal citizens — any Kosovo prime minister would sign that statute.

The United States would then deal with the remaining non-recognizers. Greece would recognize Kosovo once the statute is signed, and that would fundamentally change the dynamics for Romania, Slovakia, and Spain.

Once Kosovo has a NATO path — even before full membership — the game is effectively over. Serbia’s strategy of non-recognition, diplomatic obstruction, and reliance on Russia and China at the UN Security Council becomes meaningless.

NATO membership matters far more to Kosovo than UN membership. Just ask Ukrainians: would they rather be members of the UN or NATO? The answer is obvious — NATO.

At that point, Serbia would be watching Montenegro advance toward the EU and Kosovo move toward NATO, while Serbia stands still. That would be very difficult to sustain politically.

So yes — this proposal is far more realistic than many people think.

Russia’s Hybrid Warfare and the Wider European Context

Jabir Deralla: How do you think all of this might alter Russia’s hybrid warfare — which has been waged for quite some time and is currently ongoing — against Europe?

Edward P. Joseph: You are asking exactly the right question. How does this twin approach — bringing the Kosovo model into Donbas and bringing Serbia, together with Kosovo, toward NATO — connect to the wider struggle? What is the link here?

You framed it correctly, because we are involved in a geostrategic conflict in Europe with a revisionist power — Russia. There is a broader struggle underway. And this is not just my assessment. You can see it in the positions taken by European leaders, including President Macron of France — a country that has traditionally had a certain sentimental attachment to Russia — now leading concern about the American approach.

Europeans understand that Ukraine’s fight is Europe’s fight. If there is surrender or collapse, we are talking about a dramatic change in Europe’s security and a significant increase in vulnerability.

The Balkans are part of this picture. Ukraine represents the kinetic dimension of this conflict; the Balkans represent its hybrid dimension, exactly as you pointed out. And the key question is: through what avenue does Russia wage this hybrid warfare?

People often focus on individual techniques — disinformation, political interference, economic pressure — but that misses the larger point. The point is that Moscow has a strategic partner in the Balkans, and that partner is Belgrade.

If you remove that strategic partnership — and I believe you can — the hybrid warfare architecture collapses. And again, we are talking about a realistic context. Serbia is already under pressure over Gazprom’s control of NIS. This is not some hypothetical scenario invented by an academic. This is the real political environment.

What I am proposing is a continuation of what the administration is already doing. Don’t stop with NIS. Continue.

Let me add a few additional reasons why this is plausible. When I presented this idea in Rome in October at the NATO Defense College Foundation conference, there was strong interest, along with skepticism. Many people said, “Serbia would never do this.”

Let me give you two concrete examples.

First, the current Serbian ambassador to the United States, Dragan Šutanovac — a former Serbian Minister of Defense — has long publicly advocated that Serbia should, in his words, “accept reality” and join NATO. He has said this would be in Serbia’s own security and economic interests. And he is right. The fact that the Serbian ambassador himself has made this argument tells you this is not an unrealistic idea.

Second, there is a widespread assumption that Serbian society uniformly opposes NATO. It is true that some people do — and the government has actively promoted anti-NATO sentiment by repeatedly invoking the 1999 Kosovo bombing. That narrative has shaped public attitudes.

But at the same time, the Serbian government maintains good relations with NATO, and very strong bilateral military and defense cooperation with the United States. This is not hidden; it is a matter of record.

Finally, let me point to public opinion data. The most recent survey by the International Republican Institute, covering the region and including Serbia, showed that more Serbian citizens hold a favorable view of NATO than an unfavorable one. If you combine those who support NATO membership with those who say Serbia should increase communication with NATO — even without full membership — that represents a net favorable position of around 50 percent.

And this is in a media environment where President Vučić has dominant influence over narratives. Those narratives could change very quickly.

Kosovo Model and Donbas: Transferable Elements

Jabir Deralla: You argue that elements of the Kosovo model could be adopted to address governance and security questions in Ukraine’s Donbas region. Which aspects of this model do you consider most transferable to the Ukrainian context, and why?

Edward P. Joseph: Thank you for that question. I’ll answer it by addressing three aspects: first, what this approach offers to the United States and its partners who are trying to negotiate an end to the war, led of course by the White House; second, what it offers to Ukraine; and third, what it offers to Russia — because Russia is a factor here, and no peace arrangement works unless both sides can accept it.

The Kosovo model does require pressure, and that pressure does not currently exist in this context. But we also have to recognize that the current diplomatic effort could collapse. After the recent meeting, the ball is in Moscow’s court. If this effort collapses, people will ask, “What do we do now?” That is where the Kosovo model becomes relevant.

This model is based on UN Security Council Resolution 1244, adopted after the NATO bombing. And here is the context we need to remember: Vladimir Putin is a consistent champion of Resolution 1244. Even though people say the situations are different — that Serbia was defeated — Putin constantly insists there must be full respect for 1244.

What else does Putin say? He says that Kosovo and Ukraine are “absolutely the same.” That is his phrase. He repeats this in words and actions, including in discussions involving the UN Secretary-General. His argument is essentially: NATO did this to Kosovo, therefore I can do it to Ukraine.

So even if others argue that the two cases are different, Vladimir Putin does not see any difference. He repeatedly states that the situations are the same.

What does the Kosovo model actually do? The essence of Resolution 1244 is that it neither declared Kosovo independent of Serbia nor denied that possibility. It deliberately occupied a middle ground.

That is critically important for the United States as a negotiator, because we know what the key problem is: security guarantees. We know Russia wants to press its advantage in Ukraine by insisting on them. The value of the Kosovo model, from a negotiating perspective, is that it takes the question of sovereignty out of the immediate picture.

It is no longer about who owns Donbas. Once that question is set aside, it becomes much easier for the sides to negotiate other issues.

For President Zelensky, this approach allows him to say that the region remains part of Ukraine. Under the Kosovo model, there would eventually be a referendum. He can explain to Ukrainian citizens that peacekeeping troops would be deployed, as they were in Kosovo; that there would be an international administration, as in Kosovo; and that the UN — or the OSCE, as in Kosovo — would be present.

Because of this, displaced citizens would be able to return, and eventually the people themselves would decide in a referendum. He can present this to his citizens rather than being forced to simply give away land.

What does this allow for Vladimir Putin? First, it allows him to see that there would be zero exercise of Ukrainian sovereignty over the territory during this period. Formally, President Zelensky can say the region remains part of Ukraine, but as we saw in Kosovo, Serbia has no flags, no symbols, no practical expression of sovereignty. The same would apply here.

More importantly, we need to ask what Putin really wants, and why this is plausible. Putin wants territory. He wants more than the areas currently being discussed around Kherson or Kharkiv. He wants the maximum he can get in order to exert maximum pressure on Kyiv.

Under my approach, Ukraine could afford to place more territory at risk — even territory that some in Ukraine would consider extremely dangerous, including areas whose loss could threaten the capital. Ukraine could do this because the territory would not go to Russia. It would go to a third party.

There would be peacekeeping troops, the territory would be under UN administration, and all of this would be ratified by the UN Security Council — which Putin wants. And there would eventually be a referendum.

In that sense, each side gains something. Putin might say he prefers another approach, or that he wants to take immediate gains. But under this approach, he could potentially gain more — provided he stops the fighting, allows the insertion of peacekeeping forces, and accepts that the final outcome would be subject to an internationally managed referendum.

Yes, he would have to accept that. But if you are negotiating seriously from an American perspective, you have a strong argument. You can say to Vladimir Putin: we are doing exactly what you insist upon in Kosovo — which you say is absolutely the same as Ukraine. That is my argument.

Urgent Steps for Democratic Resilience: Ukraine, the Western Balkans, and Europe

Jabir Deralla: Looking at Ukraine, the Western Balkans, and Europe as interconnected front lines, what do you think are the most urgent steps that need to be taken in the next six to twelve months, in 2026, to strengthen democratic resilience and prevent authoritarian actors from closing the strategic window opened by your initiative and ideas?

Edward P. Joseph: Let’s be very clear and succinct about the priorities.

First, of course, is providing Ukraine with the support it needs — both military and political. Few people can influence what this administration ultimately decides, but if the current talks collapse and Russia is clearly blamed, we could return to a situation where President Trump himself, as well as Vice President Vance, have spoken publicly — including at the UN — about Ukraine’s ability to recover its territory. President Trump has shifted positions before. That said, we also know about his long-standing affinity for Vladimir Putin, which is extremely dangerous and, frankly, baffling. Still, priority number one remains full support for Ukraine.

Second, in the Balkans, we must continue on all constructive paths. The focus should be on Belgrade, and specifically on accelerating the process of removing Russian influence. That means nationalizing NIS and forcing Russia out. When that happens, it will be a significant moment — not only for Serbian-Russian relations, but also for Serbia’s relations with its Western neighbors.

The administration must be prepared to capitalize on that moment. This includes advancing sanctions against RT and Sputnik, closing down the so-called “humanitarian center,” which is widely understood to be a spy base, and which frankly should never have been tolerated in the first place.

Third, we must continue addressing challenges across the region. In North Macedonia, it is essential to stop the blockage coming from Bulgaria. This is not impossible. It requires U.S. engagement and the provision of reasonable guarantees that there will not be endless new demands.

There are ways to do this. President Pendarovski has acknowledged that the ideas put forward by Professor Ognen Vangelov are reasonable — including the possibility of language in constitutional amendments that would activate defensively if Bulgaria continues making new demands. These are concrete steps that can be taken.

We must accelerate North Macedonia’s EU accession and advance reforms that address corruption and protect the Ohrid Framework Agreement. All of this is to the security and economic benefit of the country.

The same applies elsewhere in the region. Montenegro must be protected from divisive interference coming from Belgrade and affiliated actors. Albania is moving forward, but there must be continued focus on rule-of-law reforms and ensuring a viable opposition and political pluralism. We can also speak about Bosnia and Herzegovina in this context.

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So what does all of this have to do with President Zelensky? How does this help Ukraine if Serbia and Kosovo move toward NATO?

First, it means that NATO expansion is not dead. President Trump does not want to expand NATO, so if he were to change his position, that would be a powerful signal — a vote of confidence in NATO. That would matter enormously to President Zelensky and to European leaders. It would show that the United States still believes in NATO.

That matters greatly. Even if Ukraine cannot join NATO under Trump, it reinforces the idea that NATO membership remains possible in the future.

Second, it improves Ukraine’s relationship with Serbia. Once Serbia decisively breaks with Russia, cooperation with Ukraine becomes open and transparent. There is no longer a need for indirect arrangements or contradictory voting — supporting Ukraine one day and opposing it the next. Those games end.

Zelensky would also know that Putin’s argument — using Kosovo as justification against Ukraine — would be finished. If Serbia embraces NATO, recognition of Kosovo eventually follows. At that point, Putin loses that argument entirely. It disappears.

Interview: Jabir Deralla
Camera & video editing: Arian Mehmeti

Editorial note: The introductory text was prepared by the editorial team. The interview transcript was edited for clarity and length with AI-assisted language refinement. All views and opinions expressed in the interview answers are solely those of the interviewee.