By Jabir Deralla
There has been no substantial public debate in North Macedonia about the so-called Action Plan on Advancing the Rights of Persons Belonging to Communities — neither about its content, nor about its legal implications, nor about its place within the EU accession process.
Earlier, in November, the European Commission’s latest enlargement report once again called on North Macedonia to move forward with the long-delayed constitutional amendments that would recognize Bulgarians and other non-majority communities in the Constitution. This commitment forms part of the EU accession framework adopted under the French Presidency on 30 June 2022 (the so-called French Proposal), yet the required changes have still not been adopted. In its annual assessment of candidate countries, the Commission stresses that North Macedonia must fully implement all bilateral agreements, including the Prespa Agreement with Greece and the Treaty of Friendship, Good Neighborliness and Cooperation with Bulgaria — and that these must be carried out in good faith by all parties.
From what can be concluded on the basis of the Council of Europe’s own reporting, the process surrounding the draft Action Plan consisted mainly of institutional exchanges and limited expert discussions within a narrow circle. It did not amount to a broad, public, transparent, or inclusive policy debate. In practice, the plan appears to exist primarily as a formal requirement of the accession process, rather than as the product of meaningful domestic deliberation or public engagement.
What the public has instead witnessed is something else entirely: a political diversion. An administrative and procedural issue has been rapidly transformed into a set of emotionally charged and politically instrumental narratives — about national dignity, hostile outsiders, and historical grievance — none of which meaningfully engage with the document itself.
This shift was triggered when Prime Minister Hristijan Mickoski, faced with a question about North Macedonia’s position on the US military intervention in Venezuela, avoided answering it and redirected the discussion toward Bulgaria and the European Union. In doing so, he framed the country as a victim of external injustice, accused Bulgaria of sabotaging North Macedonia’s European future, and implied that the EU tolerates violations of international law when they affect “small, peace-loving nations.”
The move was rhetorically effective. It replaced an uncomfortable foreign-policy question with a familiar narrative of national grievance, and transformed a technical policy document into a symbolic battleground. From that moment on, the Action Plan ceased to function as a subject of policy discussion and became a political device — not to clarify its purpose or assess its merits, but to redirect attention and mobilise emotion.
The legal substance and policy design of the Action Plan deserve a separate and rigorous analysis of their own. But even without such an examination, its political trajectory is already clear: instead of serving as a practical mechanism for fulfilling long-standing commitments and unblocking the EU accession process, it has been absorbed into a broader pattern of diversion, grievance-based mobilisation, and identitarian framing — increasingly marked by a sceptical, and at times openly hostile, tone toward the European project itself.
In this way, the Action Plan has not entered the public sphere as a matter of democratic choice, institutional responsibility, or policy problem-solving. It has entered it as a performance — a stage on which power translates administrative obligation into symbolic conflict, and where political energy is invested not in resolving delays and commitments, but in narrating them as injustice, betrayal, or external conspiracy.
A narrative widely reproduced — and rarely examined
Following the Prime Minister’s public statement on 4 January, most domestic media outlets reproduced his claims in multiple formats and headlines, with little contextualization and no systematic effort to examine their factual accuracy.
Editorial reactions were overwhelmingly affirmative toward the Prime Minister. The narrative of external injustice and national dignity was echoed rather than tested. There appeared to be few visible actors or institutional capacities in the public sphere willing — or able — to place strategically important claims under critical scrutiny, as would be expected in a functioning democratic media environment.
Fact-checking platforms did not verify the central assertions about Bulgaria’s alleged objections to the Action Plan. Nor did European-funded civil society organizations publicly call for restraint, dialogue, or procedural clarification. Instead, the public information space was largely filled with repetitions of the Prime Minister’s framing, while the official response of the Bulgarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs — despite its direct relevance — received little to no coverage.
As a result, public discourse became dominated by political narrative rather than by verifiable facts, documented positions, or institutional context.
This asymmetry matters not only for the accuracy of reporting, but for democratic accountability itself: when political claims are amplified without verification and countervailing information is marginalized, citizens are deprived of the basis for informed judgment.
What was claimed — and what can be verified
Prime Minister Mickoski claimed that Bulgaria objected to the Action Plan because it was written in Macedonian, presenting this as evidence of hostile intent and political obstruction.
The Bulgarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, however, articulated a markedly different position.
In its official statement of 5 January, the Ministry clarified that the language of the Action Plan is an internal matter for North Macedonia and not a bilateral issue. It noted that presenting the plan to citizens in English raises questions about implementation, but does not constitute an objection. The Ministry further reiterated that the Action Plan is a step foreseen after the constitutional inclusion of Bulgarians, as agreed in the 2022 European Consensus — a step that remains outstanding. It also welcomed the Prime Minister’s stated willingness to accept remarks from the Bulgarian community.
There is therefore a clear discrepancy between the political claim and the documented diplomatic position.
This discrepancy was not examined publicly in North Macedonia.
The contrast between the two modes of communication is nevertheless evident. The Prime Minister’s statements were framed in emotive and identity-referential terms and addressed primarily to a domestic political audience. The Bulgarian Foreign Ministry’s statement, by contrast, was formulated in procedural and institutional language, referring to agreed frameworks and formal commitments. Yet only one of these modes of communication was widely amplified in the domestic information space.
Outlook: Escalation is the likely trajectory
Rather than moving toward clarification or procedural dialogue, the exchange has since escalated.
Following the Bulgarian Foreign Ministry’s response, North Macedonia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade issued a sharply worded statement accusing Bulgaria of making “abstract and unfounded comments” and calling on Sofia to show “European behaviour,” including “full respect and recognition of the Macedonian language.” The Ministry presented the draft Action Plan as a constructive step forward, prepared with domestic and international experts in consultation with the Council of Europe and the European Commission, and described North Macedonia as a positive European example in the protection of the rights of communities.
This reaction did not engage with the substance of the Bulgarian statement, which did not contest the Macedonian language, but instead reiterated that the language of the plan is an internal matter, questioned why the draft was presented to citizens in English, and recalled that the Action Plan was foreseen to follow — not precede — the constitutional inclusion of Bulgarians, as agreed in the 2022 European Consensus.
At the same time, numerous domestic media reframed the Bulgarian statement as a denial or downgrading of the Macedonian language by focusing on Sofia’s use of the phrase “a language accessible to citizens,” despite the fact that the Bulgarian text does not dispute the status of the Macedonian language and does not present the issue as a bilateral linguistic conflict.
The repetition of the Prime Minister’s original claim — that Bulgaria objected to the plan because it was written in Macedonian — continued in subsequent statements, even though this interpretation is not supported by the Bulgarian Foreign Ministry’s published position. The exchange thus shifted further away from the procedural and legal questions at stake and deeper into a symbolic confrontation structured around identity and grievance.
In this sense, escalation is not an unintended consequence but the dominant dynamic: positions are being restated, hardened, and rhetorically amplified rather than clarified, and the space for substantive dialogue or mutual understanding is narrowing rather than expanding.
Narrative control and democratic erosion
This episode illustrates how EU accession steps can be transformed into symbolic political confrontations. It is one more in a long series of cases — across the Balkans — in which populist framing displaces procedural reality and selective amplification distorts public understanding of international relations.
More fundamentally, it reveals a gap in democratic accountability: between political claims and factual verification, between diplomatic communication and public awareness, and between rhetorical escalation and institutional responsibility. The dispute over the Action Plan is no longer about minority protection. It is about narrative control.
When political actors benefit from confrontation, when media reproduce rather than scrutinize, and when institutions remain silent in the face of escalation, diversion becomes the dominant political strategy.
And democracy becomes weaker — not because of external pressure, but because of internal neglect.
Editorial note:
This article is based on publicly available statements, official documents, and media reporting from January 2026. All interpretations are the author’s own and are offered in good faith to contribute to informed public discussion.
© 2026 CIVIL / Xhabir Deralla — All rights reserved.