SKOPJE, 27 April 2026 — CIVIL MEDIA in Macedonian has released a comprehensive investigative dossier detailing the mechanics of Russian malign influence within North Macedonia. The report, which follows a forensic deep-dive into archival evidence and digital footprints, exposes a sophisticated operational model used by the Kremlin to utilize political actors in NATO member states to legitimize illegal occupations in Ukraine and Georgia. At the center of the investigation is Goran Dimov, a figure systematically promoted in Moscow as a senior official of the political party Levica (The Left), despite official denials from the party leadership in Skopje.
What began as a routine monitoring task by CIVIL’s Hybrid Threat Monitoring (CHTM) has evolved into a high-impact investigation into one of the most persistent Russian influence operations in the Balkans. Drawing on years of archival expertise and a week-long intensive deep-dive, this dossier exposes the “back-end” of a political party operating within a NATO member state while serving as a “transmission belt” for Kremlin war propaganda.
The case of Goran Dimov: A “denied” official in a Kremlin-backed network
The central figure of this investigation is Goran Dimov. In the Macedonian capital, the political party Levica (The Left) maintains a “user interface” of plausible deniability, claiming Dimov holds no official position. However, in Moscow and the Russian-occupied territories of Ukraine and Georgia, the “back-end” reveals a far more official role.
Russian state news agencies, including TASS, RIA Novosti, and KCHR Inform, consistently promote Dimov as a “Senior Advisor” and a “Member of the Foreign Policy Sector of the Levica Party.” This systematic promotion is further amplified across the Kremlin’s broader disinformation architecture, including the “Pravda” network—a core component of the notorious “Portal Kombat” operation recently exposed by European security services. This discrepancy is not a translation error; it is a calculated operational model designed to provide a legal shield for the party at home while allowing it to enjoy Russian logistical support and international promotion via the Kremlin’s most potent propaganda tools.
Tracking the pattern: From Abkhazia to Crimea
CIVIL Hybrid Hybrid Threats Monitoring team’s investigation proves that Dimov’s recent appearance in occupied Crimea is not an isolated incident but part of a documented pattern of “observing” and legitimizing illegal Russian occupations. This pattern reveals a calculated use of English-language propaganda, aimed at deceiving both domestic and international audiences by presenting a facade of global support for Russian military actions.
Abkhazia 2025: Archive records show Dimov in the Russian-occupied region of Georgia in February and March 2025. Acting as an “international observer,” he praised the “democratic” nature of the electoral process on territory that has been under active Russian occupation since 2008.
Crimea 2026: Dimov reappeared on the occupied Crimean peninsula, again using his party credentials to provide a “democratic” veneer to Russian military “liberation” narratives.
These records indicate that Dimov’s party title is a permanent fixture in the Kremlin’s operative database—a credential used to legitimize military aggression and territorial expansion. This English-language content is systematically amplified by the “Pravda” network—a central hub of the “Portal Kombat” operation—which utilizes these localized “Western voices” to populate its multilingual platforms, thereby generating a false perception of global dissent against the international diplomatic consensus. By projecting this manufactured “legitimacy” beyond its borders, the Russian propaganda machine targets the Western public in a direct attempt to erode the global rule of law.
The “back-end” strategy, plausible deniability and the “Portal Kombat” connection
The investigation defines Levica’s strategy as a digital-political hybrid. While the leadership attempts to “wear the mask” of a sovereign political entity within a NATO jurisdiction, their operative, Dimov, serves as the bridge to Russian influence centers.
Dimov is not a mistake; he is a function in the system. His denial in Skopje is the ‘user interface,’ while his actions in Moscow represent the ‘back-end’ of their true policy and ideological orientation fully aligned and coordinated by the Kremlin. This case is an integrated component of a broader European threat architecture. CHTM’s investigation links these activities to the “Portal Kombat” network—a Russian disinformation architecture consisting of nearly 200 coordinated websites (such as the multilingual platform Pravda). These platforms are designed to bypass Western sanctions and inject Kremlin narratives directly into the political bloodstream of European nations.
A transmission belt for propaganda
The findings of this dossier lead to a stark conclusion: Levica is not merely a sympathizer of the Russian cause but an organic part of the infrastructure of Russian influence in North Macedonia. By utilizing democratic mechanisms, they work to obstruct the country’s Euro-Atlantic path and undermine solidarity with Ukraine.
This case serves as a catalyst for CIVIL to look even deeper into the mechanisms of Kremlin war propaganda, specifically the “Portal Kombat” project. CHTM continues to uncover new elements of hybrid warfare where regional institutions and standard fact-checkers often lack the forensic depth to see the full picture.
CIVIL Media News Desk
(LINK to full version in Macedonian)
For more investigative reports on hybrid threats and security in the Balkans and Europe, follow civil.today.
Support CIVIL’s independent journalism
Contribute
