By Xhabir Deralla

At 2:34 a.m. on 31 October 2026, the National Bank of Serbia (NBS) announced that it had revoked Alta Bank Belgrade’s licence. One of Serbia’s fastest-growing banks, linked to circles close to Aleksandar Vučić’s Serbian Progressive Party (SNS), could no longer operate.

The NBS acknowledged a serious deterioration in the bank’s finances and risks to depositors. Serbian weekly Vreme reported that its accounts had been blocked the previous day.

The decision raises questions far beyond banking: about public money, private fortunes and political power under Vučić — and across borders.

Public money and the Macura empire

Davor Macura built an empire in banking, payments, property and insurance during SNS rule. Investigative reporting documents state contracts and subsidies involving his companies.

From 2025, Belgrade electricity payments went through Alta Bank rather than a state treasury account. Nova Ekonomija reported that state electricity company Elektroprivreda Srbije (EPS) refused to disclose its contracts with the bank, citing commercial confidentiality. Who authorised the arrangement, on what terms, and who benefited?

On 29 October, Radar reported a €12 million Alta Bank loan to a company owned by Vladan Miketić, who is on trial for attempted aggravated murder. Part of Belgrade’s Palace Albania building, under financial investigation, reportedly served as collateral. Radar also reported that police had not responded for five months to a request for information from the organised crime prosecutor.

Investigations traced Macura-linked dealings involving Nikola Petrović, Vučić’s godfather and former electricity transmission chief, and interests associated with Milan Radoičić and Zvonko Veselinović’s family. Radoičić acknowledged organising the 2023 armed attack on Kosovo police in Banjska, which killed an officer. Montenegro’s Vijesti has also reported scrutiny of interests connected to individuals close to the SNS leadership.

Was Alta’s expansion simply commercial, or did it also benefit political networks?

Four days from reassurance to collapse

On 27 October, lawyer Ivan Ninić warned of allegedly accelerated transfers towards Skopje and Moscow following Serbia’s 25 October parliamentary elections. He urged protection of public deposits.

The NBS cautioned against unverified claims and panic, emphasising that cross-border transfers followed regular banking channels. Four days later it revoked Alta Bank’s licence.

Governor Jorgovanka Tabaković, an SNS figure at the central bank’s helm since 2012, faces difficult questions. When did supervisors detect the liquidity problems? What money moved abroad after the election, to whom, and for what purpose? A lawful payment channel does not establish a transfer’s underlying purpose.

Moscow, Vienna, Washington and Podgorica

The Russian dimension predates the latest allegations. In 2024, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty reported that Serbian company Conex, subsequently targeted by EU restrictions linked to Russia’s war effort, held an Alta Bank account. That does not establish the alleged October transfers to Moscow, but warrants scrutiny of financial flows.

On 14 October, US Congressman Joe Wilson requested sanctions against Macura and three other Serbian businessmen — Ivan Bošnjak, Stojan Vujko and Željko Mitrović — citing allegations of political privilege and misuse of public resources. Alta Group rejected the allegations. The requested sanctions had not been imposed as of 31 October.

European regulators had also challenged Alta Pay Group’s involvement in Austria’s Addiko Bank amid concerns reported about ownership arrangements and anti-money-laundering controls. In Case T-85/25, Alta Pay challenged a November 2024 European Central Bank decision before the EU General Court.

Montenegro refused Macura entry on security grounds on 14 October. According to Vijesti, intelligence from foreign services contributed to that decision; his lawyers contested the measure.

North Macedonia: Who opened the doors?

While questions mounted elsewhere, Alta Bank Belgrade acquired Stopanska Banka Bitola. North Macedonia’s Securities and Exchange Commission approved the takeover offer in September 2025. By July 2026, the Serbian bank held more than 95% of voting shares. Macura also expanded into insurance through Alta Osiguruvanje in Skopje.

On 30 October, opposition politician Andrej Žernovski alleged transfers exceeding €50 million into North Macedonia and demanded answers from Prime Minister Hristijan Mickoski and central bank Governor Trajko Slaveski.

That day, Slaveski told Serbia’s N1 that the banking system was stable and cross-border flows were normal economic activity. Hours later, the Serbian parent bank lost its licence.

When did regulators learn about its deteriorating finances? Were unusual inflows recorded after 25 October? What is the Macedonian bank’s exposure to its parent and related companies? Did political relationships affect regulatory scrutiny?

The European Commission’s 2025 report identified financial investigations as a weakness: only 18 were conducted alongside organised-crime and money-laundering cases in 2024.

Alta Bank Bitola is legally separate; losing the parent bank’s licence does not automatically close it. But the parent’s crisis raises urgent questions about ownership, capital support and oversight. Responsibility also concerns previous governments and approving institutions.

A different ending, or another remake?

The Alta affair raises a larger question: how did politically connected private wealth expand through public resources, and who will account for the resulting networks?

At 2:34 a.m., Alta Bank lost its licence. Whether its fall will unravel the power structures behind its rise — from Belgrade through Skopje to wider European and Russian connections — remains to be seen. Or perhaps those networks have already learned to regroup and protect the biggest fish.

We have seen that movie before. Time will tell whether this is another remake — or, finally, a different ending.

This article is an abridged English adaptation of the full analysis originally published in Macedonian by CIVIL MEDIA on 31 October 2026.

Author’s note: This analysis is the result of independent journalistic and investigative work. All assessments, opinions and conclusions are the author’s alone and do not necessarily represent the official positions of CIVIL – Center for Freedom or the CIVIL MEDIA editorial team. The author assumes full personal and professional responsibility for its content.

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